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INTRODUCTION
The 2014 veterans benefits case law of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit mirrored a growing trend at the U.S. Supreme
Court to question the well-established tradition of judicial deference
to a federal agency's interpretation of its own regulations.1 This
1. Previous articles include: Victoria Hadfield Moshiashwili, Ending the Second
"Splendid Isolation"? Veterans Law at the Federal Circuit in 2013, 63 AM. U. L. REv. 1437
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article examines the Federal Circuit's 2014 veterans benefits cases.
Part I provides background and context for the issues raised by the
Federal Circuit's 2014 cases. Part II surveys changes in the
composition of the Federal Circuit during the past year. Part III
reviews and summarizes the Federal Circuit's 2014 veterans law cases.
Part IV discusses the court's recent willingness to question Auer
deference and how that principle applies in the context of veterans law.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S 2014 VETERANS LAW CASES
A. The Adjudication Process
The Federal Circuit reviews final decisions of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims ("Veterans Court"). These cases
originate when there is a dispute at the agency level-at the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)-after a claim has been
submitted for benefits, usually at a VA regional office ("RO").2 VA is
unusual among federal agencies in that it has statutory duties to assist
a veteran claimant in developing evidence supporting the claim.'
Once the agency determines that all necessary evidentiary
development is complete, it will adjudicate the claim.4 The RO will
issue a Rating Decision that informs the claimant of its decision and
the underlying reasons.5 The claimant can then submit a Notice of
Disagreement, after which VA will prepare a Statement of the Case
(2014) [hereinafter Moshiashwili, Splendid Isolation]; James D. Ridgway, Fresh Eyes on
Persistent Issues: Veterans Law at the Federal Circuit in 2012, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1037
(2013) [hereinafter Ridgway, Fresh Eyes]; James D. Ridgway, Changing Voices in a
Familiar Conversation About Rules vs. Standards: Veterans Law at the Federal Circuit in
2011, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1175 (2012) [hereinafter Ridgway, Changing Voices]; Paul R.
Gugliuzza, Veterans Benefits in 2010: A New Dialogue Between the Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1201 (2011); Miguel F. Eaton et al., Ten Federal Circuit
Cases from 2009 That Veterans Benefits Attorneys Should Know, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1155
(2010). Although no journal produces an annual review of veterans law at the Court
of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) level, Michael Allen explored its caselaw
from 2008 to 2010. See Michael P. Allen, The Law of Veterans' Benefits 2008-2010:
Significant Developments, Trends, and a Glimpse into the Future, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 1
(2011); Michael P. Allen, Significant Developments in Veterans Law (2004-2006) and
What They Reveal About the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 40 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 483 (2007).
2 In 2014, there were fifty-six regional offices in the United States, Puerto
Rico, and the Philippines. About VBA, VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN.,
http://www.benefits.va.gov/BENEFITS/about.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
3. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1204.
4. See generally id. at 1203-10 (detailing the procedure and determinations of
the Veterans Benefits Administration's claim adjudication process).
5. Id. at 1205.
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("SOC").6 The SOC is supposed to provide the claimant with all the
relevant law underlying the decision.7 This additional procedural
step was established to provide the claimant with the information
needed to make an informed argument against the agency's
decision because, traditionally, many claimants have been pro se.
After receiving an SOC, the-presumably now better informed-
claimant has two options: to ask for a de novo review of the claim at
the RO level, by a more senior staff member; or, to perfect the
appeal by filing a substantive appeal with the Board of Veterans'
Appeals ("Board").8
The Board, which is part of VA, provides appellate review of RO-
level decisions.9  Like the rest of the agency, its workload has
increased dramatically in the past few decades: it issued 34,028
decisions in 2000;1" 39,076 decisions in 2006;" 49,127 decisions in
2010;12 and 41,910 decisions in 2013.13 One key difference between
civil law and the law of veterans benefits is the fact that the Board-
although it is an appellate body-has the statutory power to find facts
de novo. 14  The Board's decisions "must account for the
[persuasiveness of the] evidence.. . , analyze the credibility and
6. See id. at 1206 (informing that a Statement of the Case ("SOC") is issued
when a veteran files a notice of disagreement with the Rating Decision).
7. 38U.S.C.§7105(d)(1)(B) (2012).
8. Id. § 7105(d).
9. Id. § 7101.
10. BD. OF VETERANS' APPEALS, FISCALYEAR 2000 REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN 33 (2000),
available at http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/ChairmansAnnual-Rpts/BVA2000AR.pdf.
11. BD. OF VETERANS' APPEALS, REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN: FiSYALYEAR 2006 2 (2007),
available at http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/ChairmansAnnual-Rpts/BVA2006AR.pdf.
12. BD. OF VETERANS' APPEALS, REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN: FISCAL YEAR 2010 3 (2011),
available at http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/ChairmansAnnualRpts/BVA2010AR.pdf.
13. BD. OF VETERANS' APPEALS, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT:
FIscAL YEAR 2013 5 (2014), available at http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/
ChairmansAnnual Rpts/BVA2013AR.pdf. In April 2013, the Board announced that it
planned to hire 100 new attorneys. See Steve Vogel, Veterans Face Another Backlog a Quarter-
Million AppealDisability Claims, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/politics/veterans-face-another-backlog-as-a-quarter-million-appeal-disability-
claims/2013/09/10/0078154a-15ba-1 1e3-804b-d3ala3al 8f2cstory.html.
14. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104 (2012) (requiring that decisions be based on review of
the entire records and that the decision must include findings of fact); Madden v.
Gober, 125 F.3d 1477, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (discussing that the Board must "analyze
the credibility and probative value of evidence"); Owens v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 429,
433 (1995) (same); 38 C.F.R. § 19.7 (2014) (reiterating the requirements of 38
U.S.C. § 7104).
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probative value of all material evidence... and provide the reasons
for its rejection of any such evidence."5
B. Veterans Benefits Adjudication Is Unique Among Federal Benefits Schemes
Until 1988, agency decisions were subject to neither judicial review
nor the restrictions of the Administrative Procedure Act 6 (APA), in
part because the benefits that the agency administers were viewed as
granted under a paternalistic charitable model, rather than obtained
by demonstrating entitlement in an adversarial model.7
In 1988, Congress enacted the Veterans' Judicial Review Act, 8
establishing the Veterans Court'9 as an Article I court with judges
appointed to serve fifteen-year terms.2" The Veterans Court may
decide cases by non-precedential, singlejudge memorandum
decisions; precedential three-judge panels, or full-court opinions."'
The Veterans Court applies the "clearly erroneous" standard22 to
assess the Board's factual findings; a de novo standard23 to
15. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), affJd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
16. Veterans Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 102, 102 Stat.
4105, 4106 (creating judicial review for veterans benefits decisions and to apply the
Administrative Procedure Act to the VA); see Robert W. Ginnane, "Rule Making,"
"Adjudication" and Exemptions Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 95 U. PA. L. REV.
621, 621-22 (1947) (demarcating which provisions of the APA do not apply to the VA).
17. James D. Ridgway, The Veterans' Judicial Review Act Twenty Years Later:
Confronting the New Complexities of the Veterans Benefits System, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 251, 251 (2010) [hereinafter Ridgway, New Complexities] (arguing that the debate
between the paternalistic and adversarial models is a false dichotomy: "[iut is
paternalistic because claimants receive significant procedural assistance. It is also an
entitlement system because claimants pursue non-discretionary benefits").
18. Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988).
19. The U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals was renamed the U.S. Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims by the Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-368, § 511(a), 112 Stat. 3315, 3341.
20. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251, 7253(c) (2012) (restating the codified language of the
Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988).
21. See id. § 7254(b)-(d); Bethea v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 252, 254 (1992) ("A
single-judge disposition is not binding in another case before a single judge or a
panel. It may be cited or relied upon, however, for any persuasiveness or
reasoning it contains.").
22. Hood v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 295, 299 (2009); see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1
Vet. App. 49, 52 (1990) (determining that the "clearly erroneous" standard is the
same in the Veterans Court as it is in Article III courts: "[w]here there are two
permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be
clearly erroneous").
23. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(1)-(3) (granting the Veterans Court the to decide
questions of law and define statutory and regulatory language); see also Lane v.
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interpretations of statutes and regulations; and an "arbitrary,
capricious.... abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law" standard to its legal conclusions.24  The Veterans Court
also reviews Board decisions to determine whether an adequate
statement of reasons or bases for the findings and conclusions
supports the decision.25
The Veterans Court is the first stage in the veterans benefits system
that is adversarial, because the claimant is challenging the Board's
decision; generally, the VA adjudication procedure is supposed to be
a non-adversarial and claimant-friendly forum.26 Yet, only veterans
and their dependents may appeal to the Veterans Court.27 Thus, the
court's substantive law tends to "act[] as a one-way ratchet" and the
court typically issues holdings that favor veterans rather than the
agency.28  This necessary focus on procedure instead of factual
development of cases-over which the Veterans Court has no
jurisdiction-has the paradoxical effect of making the system more
claimant-friendly, while causing severe delays in claims processing by
establishing increasingly complex procedures to govern the
adjudication process.29
Although only veterans may appeal a Board decision, both VA and
the claimant have the right to appeal to the Federal Circuit if they are
dissatisfied with a Veterans Court decision.° This is the first stage in
the claims adjudication process when VA may appeal a decision.1
However, the Federal Circuit may only review questions of law, such
Principi, 339 F.3d 1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (requiring the Veterans Court to
review de novo Board interpretation of a regulation); cf. Butts v. Brown, 5 Vet. App.
532, 539 (1993) (en banc) (holding that the Board's choice of a particular diagnostic
code is subject to arbitrary and capricious standard of review because it is a "question
of the application of the law to the facts and not a question of law").
24. 38 U.S.C. § 7261 (a) (3) (A); see also Foster v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 393, 394
(1991) (per curiam) (holding that failure to comment on a veteran's testimony at a
hearing does not constitute an arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law decision).
25. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1).
26. Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing to H.R. REP. No.
100-963, at 13 (1988), which demonstrated Congress's intent to preserve a pro-
claimant system).
27. 38 U.S.C. § 7252 (a).
28. Ridgway, New Complexities, supra note 17, at 257.
29. See Ridgway, Fresh Eyes, supra note 1, at 1039, 1044-45 (explaining that since
the record is rarely sufficient by the time attorneys become involved, remand back to
the VA is necessary to submit new evidence).
30. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a).
31. See id. (prohibiting the Secretary from seeking to review the Board's decisions).
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as constitutional challenges and, less frequently, challenges under the
APA to VA rulemaking.32 The system was created to guarantee that
those who had served in the military would receive the necessary
treatment if injured.3 An adversarial system would not have achieved
that objective because "[t]he government's interest in veterans cases
is not that it shall win, but rather that justice shall be done, that all
veterans so entitled receive the benefits due to them."
34
Navigating the VA claims processing system can be complex and, as
a result, it may be too difficult for many veterans to obtain the
compensation to which they are entitled.35 To support veterans who
request benefits, Congress established that VA has "the affirmative
duty to assist claimants by informing veterans of the benefits available
to them and assisting them in developing claims they may have,"6
including obtaining records under governmental control,37 helping
32. Id.§7292(d)(1).
33. See WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., THE LAW OF VETERANS BENEFITS: JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION 3-5 (3d ed. 2002) (describing the history of veterans benefits from
thanks for Sir Francis Drake's defeat of the Spanish Armada to the present); James D.
Ridgway, The Splendid Isolation Revisited: Lessons from the History of Veterans' Benefits
Before Judicial Review, 3 VETERANS L. REv. 135 (2011) (detailing the history of veterans
benefits from the earliest days of civilization to the present); see also Richard E. Levy,
Of Two Minds: Charitable and Social Insurance Models in the Veterans Benefits System, 13
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 303, 308-09 (2004) (describing the origins of the modern
veterans benefits).
34. Barrett v. Nicholson, 466 F.3d 1038, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
35. DeLisio v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 45, 63 (2011) (Lance, J., concurring)
("There is an unfortunate-and not entirely unfounded-belief that veterans law is
becoming too complex for the thousands of regional office adjudicators that must
apply the rules on the front lines in over a million cases per year."); Ridgway, Fresh
Eyes, supra note 1, at 1044-45 (discussing complexity).
36. Jaquay v. Principi, 304 F.3d 1276, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (noting
that Congress enacted the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 "to reaffirm and
clarify" the Secretary of Veterans Affairs' duty to assist veterans in obtaining
benefits), overruled on other grounds by Hendersen v. Shinseki, 589 F.3d 1201 (2009),
rev'd, 562 U.S. 428 (2011); see also Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (reaffirming VA's duty to assist veterans or those making claims on a veteran's
behalf and determining that this duty is antecedent to guaranteeing that all issues
are properly raised on appeal).
37. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a) (1) (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c) (2) (2013).
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the veteran to obtain private records,38 and providing the veteran with
a medical opinion if one is necessary to review and to assess the claim.39
VA's duty to assist allows it to read a plaintiffs pleadings
"sympathetically" to "determine all potential claims raised by the
evidence," no matter how those claims are identified in the
application for benefits.4" Furthermore, certain legal presumptions
facilitate veterans' ability to demonstrate the validity of certain types
of claims by eliminating the requirement that they submit evidence of
a link between their disability and their military service.4
Veterans law uses a lower burden of proof2 and radically different
procedural standards than other areas of the law.43 For example, a
38. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(b) (1); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(1); see also Loving v. Nicholson,
19 Vet. App. 96, 102 (2005) (holding that the duty to assist requires VA to "make
reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining [relevant] evidence" (quoting 38
U.S.C. § 5103A(a)-(b)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
39. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d); Green v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 121, 124 (1991)
(requiring a thorough medical examination that considers past medical records); see
also McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79, 81-84 (2006) (discussing the four
elements needed to trigger the duty).
40. Szemraj v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Cook v.
Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Robinson v. Mansfield, 21 Vet. App. 545, 552 (2008) (mandating
that the Board must consider any issue that is raised by the veteran or by the record),
affd sub nom. Robinson v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
41. For example, veterans who served landside in Vietnam are generally
presumed to have been exposed to Agent Orange and do not have to show
individualized exposure to Agent Orange. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a) (6) (iii). In addition,
certain disabilities are presumed to be caused by exposure to Agent Orange, thereby
eliminating the need for a veteran who qualifies for the presumption to prove a
causal connection between his military service and his disability. 38 U.S.C. § 1116(a);
38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(a) (6), 3.309(e). Chronic diseases and certain tropical diseases
can also be automatically service-connected. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 1101 (3)-(4) (listing
chronic and tropical diseases); id. §1101(4) (tropical diseases); id. §1133
(presumptions for tropical diseases); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(4) (presumption
criteria for tropical diseases); id. § 3.309(a) (listing chronic diseases); id. § 3.309(b)
(listing tropical diseases).
42. The "benefit of the doubt" doctrine is unique to veterans law, dictating that a
claim will be granted if the evidence for and against the claim is in "relative
equipoise" and will only be denied if a fair preponderance of the evidence is against
the claim. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (explaining that when the evidence in favor of
and against the claimant is approximately balanced, the VA should resolve the issue
in favor of the claimant); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (stating that reasonable doubt must be
resolved in favor of the claimant); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55 (1990)
(likening the benefit of the doubt rule to "the rule deeply embedded in sandlot
baseball folklore that 'the tie goes to the runner"').
43. See, e.g., James D. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?: A Comparative Analysis of
Appellate Review by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 1 VETERANS L.
REv. 113, 115-16 (2009) [hereinafter Ridgway, Why So Many Remandsj (elucidating
[Vol. 64:10071014
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veteran can continue to submit information during the pendency of a
claim and, if this is what transpires, the claim may be delayed while
the RO reassesses and re-adjudicates in order to issue a revised
decision to the veteran." In addition, although a decision may be
deemed "final" if a veteran neglects to appeal the decision within the
prescribed time period, there are ways to challenge a decision-even
decades after it issues-such as filing a motion alleging that the
decision should be revised because it is the product of "clear and
unmistakable error."4 As a result, there is no such thing as finality in
a veterans case.46
Although Congress established the veterans benefits adjudication
system to be "claimant-friendly," the system has functioned
inadequately for decades.47 VA is a vast and extremely complicated
bureaucracy that has expanded as a result of the incorporation of
three separate agencies in the more than eighty years since its
inception." As a result, its current processes are often happenstances
of history rather than the result of planning or strategizing.
Nowhere is this phenomenon clearer than in VA's disability
compensation claims processing system, which is straining under its
antiquated assumptions about the needs of veterans and collapsing
that because veterans benefits cases arise years after the end of the veteran's
military service, these cases typically have complicated factual scenarios, unlike
other types of actions).
44. Id. at 126.
45. Id. at 128; see 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403 (delineating CUE).
46. See Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?, supra note 43, at 126 (suggesting that it
could take years before the Board can rule on an appeal if the veteran continues to
submit new evidence).
47. See U.S. GEN. ACcOUNTING OFFICE, B-i 18660, MANAGEMENT PRACTICES USED BY
THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION'S DENVER REGIONAL OFFICE IN ASSISTING VETERANS 6-9
(1974) (investigating complaints that the telephones were constantly busy, veterans'
calls were being routed on a "haphazard" basis, and there were excessive delays in
resolving problems); Duncan D. Hunter & Pete Hegseth, Editorial, The VA Is Failing
Veterans, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
the-va-is-failing-veterans/2013/04/10/0fd9e264-alm-11e2-82bc-511538ae90a4_
story.html (recommending Secretary Shinseki resign so another appointee can
resolve VA's struggle with slow claims processing).
48. History-VA History, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.va.gov/
aboutva/vahistory.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2014) (explaining that the Veteran's
Bureau, the Bureau of Pensions in the Department of the Interior, and the National
Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers and the National Cemetery Administration,
are the three agencies that originally administered benefits to veterans and were
consolidated into individual bureaus under VA).
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under the strain of increasingly complex claims.49 In addition to the
burdens placed on the system, the laws and regulations that govern it
are becoming increasingly complex.5° This leads to frequent mistakes
in adjudication, and claims decisions made across the system have a
historically low accuracy rate.5' This sub-par record leads to lost or
improperly granted benefits, which in turn leads to a repeating
49. See, e.g., William F. Fox, Jr., Deconstrcting and Reconstructing the Veterans Benefits
System, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 339, 339 (2004) [hereinafter Fox, Deconstructing]
(explaining that veterans as a constituency are relatively weak, divided, and small,
meaning there is little pressure from the public on the government to reform
dysfunctional systems); James T. O'Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veterans
Appeals Process Is Needed to Provide Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 223, 224
(2001) (positing that recycled claims with limited judicial oversight causes
interminable wait times for veterans); Reynolds Holding, Insult to Injuy, LEGAL
AFF. (Mar./Apr. 2005), http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2005/
feature-holding-marapr05.msp (concluding that VA directives that conflict with
laws and regulations, coupled with specialization that divides a single claim into
multiple levels of review, has exacerbated the problem of unresolved claims); see
also An Examination of Poorly Performing U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Regional
Offices: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance & Mem 'l Affairs of the H.
Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 112 Cong. 44 (2011) (statement of Gerald T. Manar,
Deputy Director, National Veterans Service, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the
United States) ("[M]ost people within [VA's claims processing system] want to do
a good job. However, conditions beyond their individual control keep them from
achieving consistently good work."). See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-07-562-T, VETERAN'S DISABILITY BENEFITS: PROCESSING OF CLAIMS
CONTINUES TO PRESENT CHALLENGES 3 (2007) (explaining that several factors are
continuing to create challenges for VA's claims, including increased claims filed by
veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-05-749T, VETERANS' DISABILITY BENEFITS: CLAIMS PROCESSING PROBLEMS
PERSIST AND MAJOR PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS MAY BE DIFFICULT 3 (2005) (stating
that VA's disability programs have not been updated to reflect the current state of
science, medicine, technology, and labor market conditions); Jonathan Goldstein,
Note, New Veterans Legislation Opens the Door to Judicial Review... Slowly!, 67 WASH.
U. L.Q. 889, 895 (1989) (discussing the Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No.
100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988)).
50. Ridgway, Fresh Eyes, supra note 1, at 1044-45, 1094.
51. Adjudicating VA's Most Complex Disability Claims: Ensuring Quality, Accuracy and
Consistency on Complicated Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance &
Mem'l Affairs of the H. Comm. On Veterans' Affairs, 113 Cong. 44 (2013) [hereinafter
Complex Disability Claims Hearing] (statement of Zach Hearn, Deputy Director for
Claims, The American Legion) (noting that an independent review of 260 VA claims
showed a 55 percent error rate, which differed from VA's reported 90 percent
accuracy rate); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-i 18660, MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
USED BY THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION'S DENVER REGIONAL OFFICE IN ASSISTING
VETERANS, 1, 6-8, 10 (1974) (detailing problems in the Denver VA regional office,
such as lack of training for VA employees).
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process of appeals and remands.52 For example, even when benefits
are awarded, the disabling condition may be evaluated as less severe
than it is or the effective date on which compensation begins may be
incorrectly calculated, leading to inadequate financial compensation.
C. Problems in the Veterans Benefits Adjudication System
Despite its noble purpose, VA has persistently failed to reduce its
backlog of benefits claims.53 The bases of this issue are multiple and
systemic.54 One problem is that some of the principles essential to
52. See Complex Disability Claims Hearing, supra note 51, at 37-39 (statement of
Ronald Abrams, National Veterans Legal Services Program) (finding that a
significant source of error came from premature claim denials-before the VA
adjudicator even attempted to assist the veteran in developing her claim).
53. See Hunter & Hegseth, supra note 47 (noting that a recent study showed that
the average wait time for a claim to process is approximately one year, lagging by as
much as 600 days in New York or Los Angeles).
54. See Victoria Hadfield Moshiashwili & Aaron Hadfield Moshiashwili,
Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Lessons from the History of VA's Growing
Disability Claims Backlog 2-3 (Oct. 31, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1952070 (finding that the VA has "several fundamental
problems" at the root of its claims backlog, "includ [ing]: (1) the system that VA uses
to assess the productivity of its employees; (2) the seriously disorganized state of
many claims files; and (3) a few identifiable types of inherently difficult claims"). In
addition to more claims being submitted and the historically poor accuracy rates at
some ROs, the structure of the adjudication system itself is based on antiquated
premises. For example, the diagnostic codes are based on decades old medical
principles. James D. Ridgway, Lessons the Veterans Benefits System Must Learn on
Gathering Expert Witness Evidence, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 405, 420-24 (2009) (noting that the
forms used in medical evaluations were developed decades ago). Another problem
that must be addressed is the need for VA to develop "new, robust evidence-
gathering procedures." Id. at 405.
Other problems exist within the VA. In 2014, the Veterans Health Administration
(VHA) was the subject of a Justice Department criminal investigation and additional
investigations by the VA Inspector General and Congress after reports that numerous
veterans died while waiting for care at VHA facilities in Phoenix, Arizona, and
elsewhere. VA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 14-02603-178, INTERIM REPORT: REVIEw OF
PATIENT WAIT TIMES, SCHEDULING PRACTICES, AND ALLEGED PATIENT DEATHS AT THE
PHOENIX HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 1 (2014). Although the benefits adjudication system
was not part of this scandal, this distinction may have been lost on the general public.
Over time, the public has become accustomed to hearing news stories about VA's
inefficiency, and this incident further tarnished VA in the public's view. Eric
Shinseki, who had been Secretary of VA since January 2009, resigned amid the
scandal. See Transcript: President Obama's Remarks on Resignation of Veterans Affairs
Secretary Eric Shinseki, WASH. POST (May 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/transcript-obamas-remarks-on-resignation-of-va-secre tary-e ric-
shinseki/2014/05/30/92cd831 a-e8Oc- 1e3-afc6-aldd9407abcf .story.html; Ashley
Fantz, Shinseki Couldn't Weather Firestorm Over Scandal that "Anguished" Him, CNN (May
30, 2014, 2:34 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/23/us/shinseki-profile. In July
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the veterans benefits system-that is, that the system should be pro-
claimant and, as a result, fundamentally different from general legal
principles-basically meant that the law of veterans benefits
developed in relative isolation, even after the 1988 establishment of
judicial review of veterans claims decisions.
Criticism of the VA's claims processing system, the Veterans
Benefits Administration (VBA), continued in 2014. A July 2014
report from VA's Office of Inspector General reviewed the previous
year's "Special Initiative To Process Rating Claims Pending Over 2
Years" and reported dismal results.5 It concluded that the Special
Initiative procedure-in which veterans received a provisional
decision on claims that had been pending over two years, even if
some evidence was outstanding-had actually been less effective than
the existing procedures in granting benefits quickly and accurately.56
However, it allowed VBA to remove these claims, which had been
evaluated "provisionally" from its pending inventory, despite the fact
that the claims still needed to be finalized.57 The report concluded
that "[t] his process misrepresented VBA's actual workload of pending
claims and its progress toward eliminating the overall claims
backlog."58 After the VA provisionally assessed pending claims, the
agency did not prioritize finalizing them, leading to an estimated
6,860 provisional ratings lacking final decision as of January 2014."9
In addition, 32 percent of the claims reviewed by the Office of the
Inspector General were processed inaccurately and, because the
agency did not ensure that provisionally evaluated claims were
2014, he was replaced by Robert A. McDonald, a U.S. Army veteran and the retired
Chair, President, and CEO of Proctor & Gamble. SeeJulie Pace, Obama Selects Former
Procter and Gamble Executive Robert McDonald to Head Veterans Affairs, U.S. NEWS (June
29, 2014, 4:04 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2014/
06/29/obama-picks-ex-p-g-head-to-lead-veterans-affairs.html; Office of Pub. &
Intergovernmental Affairs, The Honorable Robert A. McDonald, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS
AFr., http://www.va.gov/opa/bios/biomcdonald.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
55. VA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 13-03699-209, REVIEW OF THE SPECIAL INITIATIVE
To PROCESS RATING CLAIMS PENDING OVER 2 YEARS i, 1-2 (2014) (detailing the VA's
process of issuing provisional ratings for cases which required evidence and handling
claims over two years old within 60 days).
56. Id. at 2 (explaining that although the Special Initiative provisional ratings
process allowed VBA to deny claims more quickly than the existing process, it did
not enable VBA to grant claims more quickly and delayed appeal rights for
provisional ratings).
57. Id.
58. Id. at i.
59. Id.
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identified and tracked properly, some veterans did not receive the
finalized decisions.60
Despite the turmoil, VA seems to be standing behind the goal it
established in 2010: that, by 2015, the agency will have eliminated
the disability claims backlog and will be processing all claims with an
accuracy rate of 98 percent within 125 days of applying for benefits.
61
II. COMPOSITION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
In the three years preceding 2014, the composition of the Federal
Circuit changed significantly after years of relative stability. In 2011,
one judge left the court, two judges died, two assumed senior status,
and three new judges were confirmed.62 Between 2012 and 2013, two
more judges assumed senior status.63 In 2013, Judges Richard G.
Taranto, Raymond T. Chen, and Todd M. Hughes were confirmed
and began active service at the Federal Circuit." Judge Chen
authored his first veterans law decision in Carroll v. McDonald,65 on
September 24, 2014.66 Judge Hughes authored three veterans law
decisions in 2014.67
60. Id.
61. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs FY 2012 Budget for the Veterans Benefits
Administration, National Cemetery Administration, and Related Agencies: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Disability Assistance & Mem' Affairs of the H. Comm. on Veterans' Affairs,
112 Cong. 27-28 (2011) (statement of Michael Walcoff, Acting Under Secretary for
Benefits). However, it is currently far from meeting this target. Id. at 1-2 (statement
of Rep. Jon Runyan, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Disability Assistance and
Memorial Affairs for the Committee on Veterans Affairs).
62. Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1177-80. In 2011, the Federal
Circuit saw the retirement of ChiefJudge Paul Michel, the deaths ofJudge Daniel M.
Friedman and Judge Glenn Archer, and the assumption of senior status by Judge
Haldane Robert Mayer and Judge Arthur J. Gajarsa. Id. at 1177-79. New judges,
including Judge Kathleen M. O'Malley, Judge Jimmie V. Reyna, and Judge Evan J.
Wallach, with perspectives outside of veterans law, replaced several of these judges,
who were veterans themselves. Id. at 1180.
63. Moshiashwili, Splendid Isolation, supra note 1, at 1447 (including Judges
William Curtis Bryson and Richard Linn).
64. See Raymond T. Chen, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. APP. FOR FED. CIR.,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/raymond-t-chen-circuitjudge.html (last visited
Apr 23, 2015); Richard G. Taranto, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. APP. FoP FED. CIR.,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/richard-g-taranto-circuit-judge.html (last visited
Apr. 23, 2015); Todd M. Hughes, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. APP. FOR FED. CIR.,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/todd-m-hughes-circuit-judge.html (last visited
Apr. 23, 2015).
65. 767 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
66. Id. at 1368, 1370-72 (affirming the Veterans Court's decision that section
101(e) of the Veterans Benefits Act of 2003 confirms that the remarried widows of
2015] 1019
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In 2014, the only change in the court's composition occurred when
Chief Judge Randall Rader stepped down as Chief in May and
resigned from the court in June.68 He was succeeded as Chief by
Judge Sharon Prost on May 31, 2014.69 President Obama's nominee
to fill the vacant seat on the court is Kara Fernandez Stoll, a partner
at Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner and former patent
examiner who holds a degree in electrical engineering and previously
served at the Federal Circuit as a law clerk to Judge Alvin Schall.7°
III. THE 2014 VETERANS BENEFITS DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
This Part considers the veterans law cases decided by the Federal
Circuit in 2014. The court issued nineteen precedential decisions on
veterans law in 2014,71 a number comparable to the twenty-one
veterans are eligible for, although not automatically entitled to, Dependency and
Indemnity Compensation).
67. See Blubaugh v. McDonald, 773 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (naming the
correct effective date for a veteran's award of disability rating); Robertson v. Gibson,
759 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that VA may consider a service member's
AWOL conviction to deny benefits, even when he had received a clemency discharge
and presidential pardon), cert. denied sub nom. Robertson v. McDonald, 83 U.S.L.W.
3707 (2015); Bowers v. Shinseki, 748 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir.) (ruling that the
presumption of a connection between military service and ALS did not apply to one
service member), cert. denied sub nom. Bowers v. McDonald, 135 S. Ct. 339 (2014).
68. Chief Judge Randall R. Rader to Step Down as Chief Judge on May 30, 2014, U.S.
CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/2014/chiefjudge-randall-r-
rader-to-step-down-as-chief-judge-on-may-30-2014.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
69. Circuit Judge Sharon Prost Assumed the Position of Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit
on May 31, 2014, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/
announcements/circuit-judge-sharon-prost-assumed-the-position-of-chiefjudge-f-
the-federal-circuit-on-may-31-2014.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
70. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, President Obama
Nominates Two to Serve on the United States Courts of Appeals (Nov. 12, 2014),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/12/president-
obama-nominates-two-serve-united-states-courts-appeals. Ms. Stoll was originally
nominated to serve on the court on November 12, 2014. Id. On December 16,
2014, the nomination was returned to President Obama as a result of the
adjournment of the Senate. 160 Cong. Rec. S6930, S6932 (daily ed. Dec. 16,
2014). On January 7, 2015, the President re-nominated her to the same position
and the nomination is, at the time of this writing, currently pending before the
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Press Release, White House
Office of the Press Sec'y, Presidential Nominations Sent to the Senate (Jan. 7,
2015), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/07/
presidential-nominations-sent-senate.
71. The Federal Circuit also issued an opinion affirming a Veterans Court
decision regarding attorney fee petitions under the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2012). See Mason v. Shinseki, 743 F.3d 1370, 1371-72
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that a statute requiring a notice of disagreement o be
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precedential decisions issued in 2013, and significantly higher than
the number of precedential decisions in 2012 and previous years.
7 2
Federal law limits the Federal Circuit's review of Veterans Court
decisions.7" Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292, the Veterans Court has
"exclusive jurisdiction" over challenges to statutes or regulations, as
well as its own interpretations of those provisions, "to the extent
presented and necessary to a decision.' 74  Therefore, except for
constitutional issues, the court may only review issues of law. It has
no power to resolve any factual matters that arise in a case decided by
the Veterans Court.75 This Article will consider each case in the order
in which VA would normally encounter these issues in processing a
benefits claim. 6
A. Eligibility for Benefits
Although claims for disability compensation often hinge on
establishing a causal link between military service and a current
disability, there are other threshold requirements for a successful
claim, such as establishing veteran status.77 Being a veteran for VA
benefits purposes may or may not include individuals who served in
the National Guard or on active or inactive duty for training,
depending on the circumstances.78  In addition, there are certain
filed within 60 days of the date notice of an adverse decision is mailed regarding a
simultaneously contested claim is applicable to attorney fee disputes). However,
that case is not discussed here because it does not pertain to the law governing
veterans benefits.
72. Moshiashwili, Splendid Isolation, supra note 1, at 1448. The Federal Circuit
issued 16 precedential veterans law decisions in 2012, 11 in 2011, and 14 in 2010.
Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1220-21 (2010 decisions); Ridgway, Fresh Eyes, supra
note 1, at 1055 (2012 decisions); Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1190
(2011 decisions).
73. 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (2012).
74. Id. § 7292(c).
75. Id.; see Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that
statutory history allows factual review only on a narrow standard that affords extreme
deference to a Board of Veterans' Appeals factual determination).
76. See, e.g., Moshiashwili, Splendid Isolation, supra note 1, at 1437-38 (indicating
the order in which the article discussed the veterans law cases decided by the Federal
Circuit in 2013).
77. See, e.g., Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that
"status as a veteran, the existence of disability, a connection between the veteran's
service and the disability, the degree of the disability, and the effective date of the
disability" are the five elements of a claim for service-connected disability compensation).
78. See, e.g., Bowers v. Shinseki, 748 F.3d 1351, 1351-52. (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(holding that, generally, claimants are not entitled to evidentiary presumptions
under either an active duty for training basis or reserve duty basis).
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conditions that act as a bar to receiving VA benefits, such as a
dishonorable discharge or an injury that was the result of the
veteran's own willful misconduct.
79
1. Veteran status and presumptive service connection
38 C.F.R. § 3.318, which VA promulgated in 2008, provides one of
the exceptions designed to ease the evidentiary burden of
establishing service connection after medical studies reported an
association between active military service and amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis (ALS). s8 The regulation provides that service connection
will be granted if ALS manifests "at any time after discharge or
release from active military, naval, or air service."8' However, VA may
not grant service connection "[i]f the veteran did not have active,
continuous service of 90 days or more. "82
In Bowers v. Shinseki" the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans
Court, which held that presumptive service connection for ALS, as
provided in 38 C.F.R. § 3.318, requires "active military, naval, or air
service" and was not applicable to the appellant, who served without
incident in the Army National Guard.84
In Bowers, Wayne E. Bowers served in the Army National Guard
from 1972 to 1978, including a continuous period of active duty for
training from August 1972 to February 1973.85 There was no
evidence that he suffered a disease or injury during this time.86 Over
30 years later, he was diagnosed with ALS and filed a claim with VA
for disability compensation for ALS and related conditions.87 The
RO denied the claim, finding no evidence that Bowers developed
ALS during his National Guard service or that his National Guard
service aggravated his ALS.ss
Mr. Bowers appealed to the Board, arguing that section 3.318
entitled him to presumptive service connection for ALS.89 The Board
79. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 3011(a) (1) (A) (ii) (2012) (establishing that willful
misconduct that leads to a discharge from active duty also precludes certain benefits,
such as educational assistance).
80. 38 C.F.R. § 3.318(b) (2014).
81. Id. § 3.318(a).
82. Id. § 3.318(b) (3).
83. 748 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
84. Id. at 1351-52.
85. Id.
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denied service connection, explaining that reserve duty and active
duty for training generally do not entitle a claimant to invoke the
evidentiary presumptions that VA has established." Therefore, he
did not qualify as a "veteran" for the purposes of VA benefits.9' Mr.
Bowers appealed to the Veterans Court, which affirmed the Board in
a single-judge memorandum decision.9"
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court
decision, holding that although the regulation did not refer to
"veteran status" explicitly, it provided that presumptive service
connection for ALS "applies after discharge or release from active
military, naval, or air service."9 The court explained that this phrase is
specifically defined by statute to include only individuals who served
on active duty or on active duty for training when the individual was
disabled or died from a disease or injury incurred or aggravated in
the line of duty-neither of which applied to Mr. Bowers.94  The
court noted that this interpretation was also consistent with the
general statutory scheme establishing veterans disability
compensation-which uses the same definition-and that the plain
language of the regulation repeats the statutory definitions.9"
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court decision.6
2. Willful misconduct as a bar to benefits
Under 38 U.S.C. § 3011, certain veterans may receive educational
assistance benefits when they are released from active duty for "a
physical or mental condition that was not characterized as a disability
and did not result from the individual's own willful misconduct but
did interfere with the individual's performance of duty."97 In Martin
v. McDonald,9" the Federal Circuit held that failure to complete a
treatment program for alcohol abuse is not necessarily willful
90. Id.
91. Id. (holding that Mr. Bowers' failure to prove that he incurred ALS during
his period of training for active duty meant that he was barred from asserting the
required service connection).
92. Bowers v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 201, 206-07 (2013). While the appeal was
pending, Mr. Bowers died and his wife was substituted as the appellant. See Bowers,
748 F.3d at 1351.
93. Bowers, 748 F.3d at 1353.
94. Id.; see 38 U.S.C. § 101 (24) (2012).
95. Bowers, 748 F.3d at 1353. Compare 38 U.S.C. § 101(24) (defining the term
"active military service" in general), with 38 C.F.R. § 3.318 (2014) (applying the
definition of active military service specifically in the ALS context).
96. Bowers, 748 F.3d at 1354.
97. 38 U.S.C. § 3011(a) (1) (A) (ii).
98. 761 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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misconduct that would bar a claimant from eligibility for VA
educational assistance benefits.99
In Martin, the veteran, Grover Martin, was serving in the U.S. Army
when he sought treatment for alcohol dependence."°0 Although he
participated in a rehabilitation program, it was not successful.10 1 He
was honorably discharged and the official reason listed was "alcohol
rehabilitation failure.' 0 2  After leaving the military, Mr. Martin
applied for, but was denied, educational assistance benefits."' He
appealed to the Board, arguing that his discharge for alcohol
rehabilitation failure was not the result of willful misconduct but
rather the result of a physical or mental condition that interfered
with the performance of his duties under 38 U.S.C.
§ 3011(a) (1) (A) (ii). °4  The Board denied the application by
concluding that the record indicated the claimant was discharged for
alcohol abuse, which it considered to be willful misconduct.10 5 Mr.
Martin appealed to the Veterans Court, which affirmed the Board's
denial of benefits as not clearly erroneous.
10 6
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that it was legal error for
the Veterans Court to affirm the Board's conclusion that the
veteran's discharge for "alcohol rehabilitation failure" constituted
"willful misconduct" under 38 U.S.C. § 3011(a) (1) (A) (ii), without
considering the specific conduct at issue, whether that conduct was
misconduct and, if so, whether the misconduct was willful.107 The
Federal Circuit held that "the correct rule of law requires factual
determinations missing from the Board's decision (and perhaps
further factual development), thus precluding the Veterans Court's
affirmance of the Board's decision."'0 8 The court's analysis rested on
the distinction between mental states and physical actions; it
concluded that "an unsuccessful attempt at rehabilitation addresses
99 Id. at 1372.
100. Id. at 1367.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1367-68.
104. Id. at 1368.
105. Id. (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(n) (2014)). "Willful misconduct.., means an act
involving conscious wrongdoing or known prohibited action .... It involves
deliberate or intentional wrongdoing with knowledge of or wanton and reckless
disregard of its probable consequences." 38 C.F.R. § 3.1 (n).
106. Martin, 761 F.3d at 1368.
107. Id. at 1369.
108. Id. (citing Hensleyv. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1263-64 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
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only a mental state, not misconduct, or willful misconduct."'' 9 The
Federal Circuit found that "[u]ltimately, the question is a statutory
one" and observed that Congress has indicated that alcohol abuse
and willful misconduct are not always the same thing.110 Accordingly,
it vacated and remanded the Veterans Court decision."'
3. Effect of a presidential pardon on a bad conduct discharge
To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must not have been
discharged from the military for bad conduct. In some
circumstances, a former service member with a bad conduct
discharge is able to get the nature of the discharge upgraded such
that VA benefits are available. The effects of a presidential pardon
on a bad conduct discharge have led to mixed results for veterans.
For example, in Robertson v. Gibson,112 the Federal Circuit held that a
presidential pardon and upgraded clemency discharge did not
preclude VA from denying disability compensation based on the
veteran's absent without leave (AWOL) conviction that led to his
original bad conduct discharge.13
Veterans are eligible for VA benefits only if they received a release
or discharge "under conditions other than dishonorable.1 4
However, there are multiple types of discharges, both administrative
and punitive."'5  Therefore, although an "honorable" discharge
establishes that a veteran is eligible for VA benefits,'16 when a veteran
is discharged for bad conduct it is not always immediately clear whether
a veteran is eligible for benefits if he or she did not receive a dishonorable
discharge. In such circumstances, VA must determine whether a
veteran's discharge was "under conditions other than dishonorable.
" ' 17
109. Id. at 1370.
110. Id. at 1371-72 (interpreting the disjunctive construction of three veterans
disability statutes related to alcohol abuse and the exclusion of the phrase "or abuse
of alcohol or drugs" from willful misconduct in the 1991 National Defense
Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. 101-510, §562(a)(1), 104 Stat. 1485, 1574 (Nov. 5,
1990), as evidence that Congress did not intend the two issues to be co-extensive
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
111. Id. at 1372.
112. 759 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Robertson v. McDonald,
83 U.S.L.W. 3707 (2015).
113 Id. at 1359.
114. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(a) (2014).
115. See id. § 3.12(b), (d)-(f) (delineating the various activities or behaviors that
may result in discharges, including honorable, general, and dishonorable discharges).
116. Id. § 3.12(a), (e).
117. Id. § 3.12(a).
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After the Vietnam War era, President Ford established a program
for service members who had committed military absence offenses
during the Vietnam War.118 In exchange for completing a period of
alternative service in the national interest, these veterans received two
benefits: (1) they could upgrade their bad conduct discharges to
neutral clemency discharges, and (2) they could receive a
presidential pardon for the felony conviction they had received for
violating military law."' Both of these alternatives were intended to
improve employability for individual veterans, as well as to "'bind the
Nation's wounds and to heal the scars of divisiveness' inflicted upon
American society during the Vietnam War.'
12
While the program offered veterans a partial restoration of rights,
it was designed to be limited in nature. The program was not
intended to provide full amnesty for all applicants, but rather to offer
veterans an opportunity for a moderate amount of clemency
determined on a case-by-case basis by a newly established Presidential
Clemency Board ("PCB").121 Under this program, a presidential
pardon would result in a partial restoration of rights, including the
right to vote, hold trade licenses, and hold office.122 Yet, such a
pardon would "blot[] out neither the fact nor the record of [a
felony] conviction. "123
The other benefit available-an undesirable discharge upgraded to
a clemency discharge-was also not a guarantee of eligibility for
veterans benefits. It was a neutral discharge status that neither
guaranteed nor precluded veterans' benefits, but rather allowed
applicants to apply to VA and submit an appeal if their claims were
denied.124 In all cases, an applicant was free to request additional
discharge status upgrades from the relevant military review board.125
The Federal Circuit addressed the effect of a presidential pardon
on VA eligibility for benefits during its 2014 term. Mr. Robertson
118. Proclamation No. 4313, 39 Fed. Reg. 33,293, 33,293-94 (Sept. 17, 1974). The
program also covered civilians who had committed draft offenses when called up for
service during the Vietnam War. Id. at 33,293-95.
119. Id. at 33,295.
120. Robertson v. Gibson, 759 F.3d 1351, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting
Proclamation No. 4313, 39 Fed. Reg. at 33,293), cert. denied sub nom. Robertson v.
McDonald, 83 U.S.L.W. 3707 (2015).
121. Id. at 1353.
122. Id. (citing U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENcyBD., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 186 (1975)
[hereinafter PCB REPORT], available at http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/002482729).
123. Id. (citing PCB REPORT, supra note 122, at 186).
124. Id. at 1354 (citing PCB REPORT, supra note 122, at 13).
125. Id. (citing PCB REPORT, supra note 122, at 13).
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volunteered to join the U.S. Army in July 1963.126 During his military
service, he suffered hearing loss in Germany and was sent back to the
United States for treatment.127  He was issued hearing aids and
ordered to report for duty, but failed to appear.128 He turned himself
in after being AWOL for 39 days and was convicted and sentenced to
three months of hard labor and partial pay forfeiture.29
Later in his military career, while Mr. Robertson was stationed in
Thailand, he met a Thai woman named No Lee and conceived a
child with her.30 He reported that he requested permission to marry
Ms. Lee and take her back to the United States, but his commanding
officer denied the request and threatened to demote him and to
confine him to a stockade.' The veteran again went AWOL and was
caught by military police over ten months later.3 2  During the
intervening time, he claimed he had been living with the Lee family
and teaching English at a Thai school so that he could support Ms.
Lee and their child.'33 He was tried and convicted by a general court-
martial, received a bad conduct discharge, and was sentenced to one
year of hard labor with forfeiture of pay and allowances.'34
In January 1974, before President Ford's clemency program was
announced, Mr. Robertson filed a claim with VA for disability
compensation for his hearing loss.3' The claim was denied because
"the circumstances surrounding his discharge from service precluded
consideration for any VA benefit."3 6 VA recommended that the
veteran apply to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records
(ABCMR) and request an upgraded discharge status.
137
In November 1975, Mr. Robertson applied to participate in
President Ford's clemency program.38  He completed a period of
alternative service, received a clemency discharge, and later received




129. Id. at 1354-55.
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clemency.., in furtherance of Presidential Proclamation 4313."' 9
Mr. Robertson then reapplied for VA benefits, but his application was
denied again based on "[t]he circumstances surrounding [his]
discharge from service. "140 He did not appeal this decision, and it
became final. 4 1 In 1978, he applied to the ABCMR for an upgrade in
his discharge status but his request was also denied.'42
In 1981, Mr. Robertson attempted to reopen his disability benefits
claim with VA. 143  Although the agency obtained copies of his
clemency discharge and presidential pardon, it continued to deny his
claim, explaining that his "clemency discharge... ha[d] no effect on
[its] previous decision." '" Mr. Robertson tried to reopen his claim
again numerous times over the next 25 years, always with the same
result.4 5 He did not appeal these decisions and they all became
final.'46 In November 2007, he again requested that VA reopen his
claim and, this time, he appealed the denial.
147
Before the Board, Mr. Robertson argued that VA had committed a
"clear and unmistakable error" (CUE) in 1974 when it denied his
claim for benefits because his presidential pardon "blotted out" his
AWOL conviction and bad conduct discharge.'48  The Board
disagreed and denied the claim.'49  It found that "neither the
Clemency Discharge nor Full Presidential Pardon changes the
appellant's character of discharge, which is the pivotal issue at
hand."5' The Veterans Court also disagreed, explaining that a
"broad" interpretation of the effect of a presidential pardon was
based on a line of early U.S. Supreme Court cases that had since been
overturned.151 As a result, although the pardon had negated the
139. Id. (alteration in original).







147. Id. at 1355-56.
148. Id. at 1356; see United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871)
(noting that a presidential pardon nullifies the offense that a recipient committed
and relieves him of any penalty his might have incurred).
149. Robertson, 759 F.3d at 1356.
150. Id.
151. Robertson v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 169, 176-79 (2013) (explaining that
Robertson erroneously relied on the expansive scope of the presidential pardon
outlined in Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866), and Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39
(1877), which were overturned in favor of the -view that a pardon "does not eliminate
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veteran's general court-martial conviction, VA was still free to
consider the conduct that led to the conviction in the first place
when assessing his eligibility for benefits.52 Accordingly, the Veterans
Court affirmed the Board's denial of benefits.153
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Mr. Robertson presented the
same arguments and asserted that the case was "about what it means
to be pardoned."1 54 In an opinion authored by Judge Hughes, the
Federal Circuit rejected this formulation.55  It stated that
"[c] ontrary to Mr. Robertson's assertion, this case is not about what
it means, generally, to be pardoned. This case is about what Mr.
Robertson's specific pardon means in this specific context of
veterans' benefits.'' 56 The court noted that there are multiple types
of pardons and that, although Mr. Robertson relied heavily on the
phrase "full pardon," the plain language of the pardon itself, along
with the context of President Ford's program, led to the conclusion
that VA was not precluded from considering the actions that led to




B. VA 's Duty to Assist the Veteran
Several cases on the Federal Circuit's 2014 docket addressed VA's
duty to assist veterans. One such duty includes the obligation to
provide veterans with medical examinations for post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) . 5  In Sanchez-Navarro v. McDonald,"6 the Federal
Circuit addressed the correct interpretation of 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.304(f) (3), which, for certain veterans, provides that lay testimony
alone may establish the occurrence of an in-service stressor.'6' The
regulation provides, in relevant part, that a veteran's lay testimony is
sufficient to establish an in-service PTSD stressor if
the consideration of the conduct ... that led to that conviction"), aff'd sub nom.
Robertson v. Gibson, 759 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Robertson v.
McDonald, 83 U.S.L.W. 3707 (2015).
152. Id. at 179.
153. Id. at 182.
154. Robertson, 759 F.3d at 1356.
155. Id. at 1357.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1357.
158. Id. at 1359.
159. 38 C.F.R. 3.304(f) (2014).
160. 774 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
161. Id. at 1384-85.
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a stressor claimed by a veteran is related to the veteran's fear of
hostile military or terrorist activity and a VA psychiatrist or
psychologist, or a psychiatrist of psychologist with whom VA has
contracted, confirms that the claimed stressor is adequate to
support a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder and that the
veteran's symptoms are related to the claimed stressor, in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and
provided the claimed stressor is consistent with the places, types,
and circumstances of the veteran's service .... 162
Veteran Roberto Sanchez-Navarro served in the U.S. Army from
May 1958 to March 1960, with service in the Korean demilitarized
zone.1 63 He reported that, shortly after he arrived in Korea, he was
assigned to guard duty at night."6 He could hear strange noises and
was so frightened that he stayed up all night with his pistol and
machine gun loaded and ready to shoot.1 65 He also reported hearing
gunshots and seeing many wounded soldiers while he was in Korea.'66
In 2005, he submitted a claim for service connection for PTSD, which
the RO denied.16  Ultimately, the Board found that 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.304(f) did not apply because Mr. Sanchez-Navarro had been
diagnosed by a therapist and not VA or a VA-contracted psychiatrist
or psychologist as required by the regulation.16 In addition, the
Board found that VA's duty to assist did not require it to provide Mr.
Sanchez-Navarro with a medical examination "because 'none of [Mr.
Sanchez-Navarro's] claimed stressor events ha[d] been sufficiently
corroborated by credible supporting evidence and his account of
having a continuity of PTSD symptom[s] since service [was] not
deemed credible."" 69  Mr. Sanchez-Navarro appealed, but the
Veterans Court found that the duty to assist statute did not require
VA to provide a medical examination and affirmed the Board's
162. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(0(3).
163. Sanchez-Navarro, 774 F.3d at 1382.
164. Sanchez-Navarro v. Shinseki, No. 12-1645, 2013 WL 5496825, at *1 (Vet.




167. Id. Mr. Sanchez-Navarro appealed to the Board and then to the Veterans
Court, which remanded to determine whether the revised version of 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.304(f) applied. Id. at *2.
168. See id. at *3; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2014) (requiring medical evidence
diagnosing the PTSD).
169. Sanchez-Navarro, 2013 WL 5496825, at *3 (first and fourth alterations in original).
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decision that an exam was unnecessary "because the evidence of in-
service stressor events was insufficient.'
70
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Mr. Sanchez-Navarro argued that
his claim was governed by 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (3) because his claimed
in-service stressors were "related to [his] fear of hostile military or
terrorist activity." 7' He asserted that VA was therefore required to
provide him with a medical examination because it was "necessary
to make a decision on the claim."77 He reasoned that such an
examination would allow him to fulfill section 3.304(f) (3)'s criteria
that a stressor may be established if a "VA psychiatrist or psychologist...
confirms that the claimed stressor is adequate to support a diagnosis
of [PTSD] and that the veteran's symptoms are related to the





The government agreed with Mr. Sanchez-Navarro's interpretation
of the regulation with one key caveat: it asserted that a medical
examination is only "necessary" under 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d)(1) if the
veteran's "claimed stressor is consistent with the places, types, and
circumstances of the veteran's service.174
The Federal Circuit sided with the government and explained that,
according to the regulation, Mr. Sanchez-Navarro was only entitled to
a medical examination if his claimed stressor was consistent with the
places, types, and circumstances of his service. 7 5 Judge Dyk, writing
for the majority, concluded that the regulation was "clear on its face"
and that "prior statements accompanying the publication of the
regulation" supported the agency's interpretation.7 6 He noted that,
as a result, the court does not "need [to] decide whether [it] must
defer to an agency's interpretation of a regulation that is offered for
the first time at oral argument.''17 Judge Dyk explained that both the
plain language of the regulation and the agency's statements when
the regulation was promulgated contemplated that a medical
examiner would only determine two criteria listed in the regulation:
"(1) whether 'the claimed stressor is adequate to support' a diagnosis
170. Id. at*7.
171. Sanchez-Navarro v. McDonald, 774 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting
38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (3)).
172. Id. at 1383 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d) (1) (2012)).
173. Id. (first two alterations in original) (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (3)).
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of PTSD; and (2) whether the veteran's symptoms are related to the
claimed stressor."17 He further noted that the agency's comments
at the time the regulation was promulgated also clearly stated that a
VA adjudicator, not a medical examiner, would determine whether
a claimed in-service stressor was consistent with the veteran's
military service.79
However, Judge Dyk also noted that section 3.304(f) (3) was
designed to provide "a more relaxed standard" for "credible
supporting evidence" under which the credibility of a veteran's lay
testimony would not be assessed as long as the three other conditions
were met."'° Accordingly, Judge Dyk concluded that the Veterans
Court erred when it affirmed the Board's finding that the veteran's
lay testimony was not credible without addressing whether the
claimed PTSD stressor was consistent with the circumstances of the
veteran's service.8 Therefore, the Federal Circuit vacated the matter
and remanded it for a determination as to this issue.
181
Judge Lourie dissented, asserting that the majority erred in two
respects.183 First, he concluded that the majority's interpretation of
section 3.304(f) (3) failed to follow the statutory rules for when a
medical examination will be provided."8 4 He explained that the
statute required the agency to provide a medical examination "when
such an examination or opinion is necessary to make a decision on
the claim" but that another section of the statute clarified that "[a] n
examination is only necessary 'if the evidence of record' (1)
contain[ed] 'competent evidence' of a current disability, and (2)
'indicate[d] that the disability... may be associated with the
veteran's service."85 Judge Lourie asserted that "[i]f the if criteria are
not met, the when result does not come into play" and that, therefore,
a medical examination is only "necessary to make a decision" when
the record already contains such "competent evidence."'86 Judge
Lourie also criticized the majority's analysis because, although section
3.304(f) (3) lessens a veteran's evidentiary burden, the Veterans Court
considered the claim under this section and found that it did not
178. Id. at 1384 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(0(3)).
179. Id.




183. Id. at 1385 (LourieJ., dissenting).
184. Id.
185. Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d) (1), (d) (2) (A)-(B) (2012)).
186. Id.
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apply.'87 Since Judge Lourie believed that the Veterans Court did not
misinterpret section 3.04(f) (3), he would have affirmed this portion
of the Veterans Court's decision.8
Sanchez-Navarro provides an example of a recent regulation that is
not sufficiently clear. The entire point of the regulation is buried at
the end of the sentence and it is not clear how the multiple criteria
that precede it are supposed to interact. A redrafted version might
look like this:
Unless VA provides clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary, a veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the
occurrence of a claimed in-service PTSD stressor if the following
conditions are met:
(1) a stressor claimed by a veteran is related to the veteran's fear
of hostile military or terrorist activity; and
(2) a VA (or VA-contracted) psychiatrist or psychologist confirms
that the claimed stressor is (a) adequate to support a diagnosis of
PTSD and (b) that the veteran's PTSD symptoms are related to the
claimed stressor; and
(3) a VA adjudicator confirms the claimed stressor is consistent
with the places, types, and circumstances of the veteran's service.
Sanchez-Navarro provides an example of how vague regulations can
promote confusion and lead to adjudication regarding the agency's
intentions when it promulgated the rule. The proposed redraft-
assuming it accurately reflects the intent-makes it clear how the
elements relate to each other without creating any substantive
changes in the law.
C. Service Connection
There are five aspects of a successful claim for service-connected
disability compensation.' In addition to veteran status, as discussed
above, a veteran must establish that he or she suffers from a current
disability and that this disability is causally linked to military service.9 '
The fourth and fifth aspects-evaluating how disabling the condition
is and determining the effective date of compensation-will be
addressed in later sections of this Article because they are considered
187. Id. at 1386.
188. Id.
189. See Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also 38 U.S.C.
§§ 1110, 1131.
190. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; Collaro, 136 F.3d at 1308.
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"downstream" elements of the claim that are not raised until a causal
linkage has been established.
1 91
At least initially, most disability compensation claims turn on
whether a veteran can establish that his or her current disability can
be causally linked to military service. There are numerous ways that
linkage may be proven. Establishing "direct" service connection
generally requires medical-or, in certain circumstances, lay-
evidence of (1) a current disability; (2) in-service incurrence or
aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a link between the claimed
in-service disease or injury and the present disability.'92
"Secondary" service connection is awarded when a disability "is
proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or
injury."'93 Veterans may also receive compensation under 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.310(a) when a service-connected condition aggravates a non-
service-connected condition and results in additional disability.'94
There are also regulations and presumptions that lower the
evidentiary hurdles for specific groups of veterans.19
1. Definition of a disease incurred or aggravated uring service
In O'Bryan v. McDonald,'96 the Federal Circuit deferred to the
agency's interpretation-as expressed in two VA General Counsel
opinion letters-that the statutory term "disease"-as opposed to a
noncompensable "defect"-means a medical condition that is
191. Evans v. West, 12 Vet. App. 396, 399 (1999) (noting that effective date is a
"downstream matter" to be addressed after the benefit has been awarded); see also
Vargas-Gonzalez v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 222, 228-29 (2001) ("[A] claimant's
[notice of disagreement] cannot express disagreement with an issue that has not
been decided.").
192. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussing the
requirements for lay evidence in establishing a causal nexus); Hickson v. West, 12
Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999) (explaining the standard of review to be given medical
evidence establishing a nexus between claimant's injury and service); Caluza v.
Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995) (detailing the evidentiary requirements for a
claim to be considered well grounded), affd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a), (d) (2012) (codifying evidentiary standards for evaluating
whether injury or disease is connected to service).
193. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a).
194. See Libertine v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 521, 522 (1996) (debating whether
alcohol and drug abuse stemming from PTSD is secondary); Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet.
App. 439, 448 (1995) (en banc) (determining that the scope of well-grounded
secondary condition claims should be interpreted in the veteran's favor).
195. For example, those who served in Vietnam, those who suffer from certain
listed chronic illnesses, those who served in combat, or were prisoners of war, or the
victims of in-service personal assaults. See supra note 41.
196. 771 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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capable of progression.'97 38 U.S.C. § 1110, which provides that
veterans will be compensated if they have an injury or disease
incurred or aggravated during service, does not define the term
"disease."'98 Accordingly, VA promulgated a regulation providing
that, for the purposes of providing VA benefits, "diseases or injuries"
does not include "[c] ongenital or developmental defects."99
In this case, when Mr. O'Bryan entered the service no eye
problems were recorded, and his discharge examination reported
that he had 20/20 vision.0 0 Within a year after his separation from
service, he submitted a claim for disability compensation for Leber's
optic atrophy (Leber's), asserting that he experienced blurred vision
during service.2 °' Within a year of discharge, he was legally blind due
to Leber's.212 One of the doctors who examined the veteran stated
that Leber's is a condition that "implies fixed, unchanging subnormal
vision and has no known effective treatment."°2 3  In its decision
denying benefits, the RO found that Leber's was not a disease within
the meaning of the statute and regulation, but rather a "hereditary
disorder" characterized by "bilateral progressive optic atrophy.'2 4 In
1980, the Board affirmed the denial, explaining that Leber's was not
a disease for VA benefits purposes "because such [a] disorder is
congenital or developmental" and therefore could not have been
incurred during or aggravated by service.2 °5 Mr. O'Bryan did not
appeal this decision, and it became final.0 6
Several years later, Mr. O'Bryan challenged the decision, alleging
that the Board had committed CUE.20 7 The Board reviewed the 1980
decision and determined that i was not the product of CUE.208 The
Veterans Court affirmed the Board decision, acknowledging that the
veteran's condition worsened over time but concluding that the
Board did not err when it found no CUE in the 1980 decision.2 9 Mr.
O'Bryan appealed.
197. Id. at 1381.
198. See 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2012).
199. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c) (2014).
200. O'Bryan, 771 F.3d at 1377-78.
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The Federal Circuit reviewed the statute and regulation at issue,
but noted that "[d]eference to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulation is warranted when the regulation is ambiguous," as long
as the interpretation is not "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation.""21
The court further explained that courts should defer to an
agency's interpretation of its regulation even when the agency
does not resort to formal rulemaking procedures insofar as the
agency's interpretation exhibits a "fair and considered judgment
on the matter."21'
The Federal Circuit concluded that section 3.303(c)'s reference to
[c] ongenital or developmental defects" is ambiguous."'
Accordingly, the court looked to two VA General Counsel opinions
for guidance on how the agency had interpreted the regulation.213
The first General Counsel opinion observed that the regulation's
reference to "defect" could not include every "'imperfection, failure
or absence' because that would remove all conditions from the scope
of 'disease' in 38 U.S.C. § 1110."214 The opinion explained that
"defects" are "structural or inherent abnormalities or conditions
which are more or less stationary in nature" and concluded that a
"disease" must be a condition that is "capable of improving or
deteriorating."215 The other General Counsel opinion also focused
on whether a condition could progress, and stated that the relevant
issue was the point at which the claimant began to experience
symptoms and if those symptoms "progresse[d] during service at a
greater rate than normally expected."216 The court observed that "the
210. Id. at 1379; see also Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)
(explaining that when a regulation lacks ambiguity, no deference is given to an
agency's differing interpretation); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)
(applying the requisite standards for plainly erroneous when determining the
ambiguity of agency interpretations).




214. Id. (citing Congenital/Developmental Conditions Under 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.303(c), Vet. Aff. Op. Gen. Couns. Prec. 82-90 (July 18, 1990) [hereinafter
G.C. Prec. 82-90]).
215. G.C. Prec. 82-90.
216. Congenital/Developmental Conditions Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c), Vet. Aff.
Op. Gen. Couns. Prec. 67-90 (July 18, 1990) [hereinafter G.C. Prec. 67-90]. This
opinion was previously issued on September 29, 1988, as General Counsel Opinion 8-
88. Id. It was reissued, with the substance unchanged, as a Precedent Opinion
pursuant to 38 C.F.R. §§ 2.6(e) (9) and 14.507. Id.
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relevant legal question is whether the condition is capable of progression"
and noted that this was logical because hereditary conditions capable of
progression could be aggravated by military service.217
The Federal Circuit concluded that it was appropriate to defer to
the agency's interpretation and held that a defect-which is not
compensable-is a "static condition" that does not improve or
deteriorate.218 A disease, however-which is compensable if caused
or aggravated by a veteran's military service-is a condition that is
"capable of... progression.219  Therefore, the court vacated and
remanded the claim so the correct legal standard could be applied.22 °
2. Presumption of sound condition and aggravation
One of the reduced evidentiary burdens that VA provides for
veterans seeking disability benefits is the presumption that a veteran
was "in sound condition" upon enrolling for service, except as to
conditions noted at the time.221 VA can rebut the presumption by
providing "clear and unmistakable evidence" that the condition pre-
existed military service and was not aggravated by it. 222 In Gilbert v.
Shinseki,223 the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its decision in Holton v.
Shinseki,224 holding that the presumption of sound condition applies
only to the second element of service connection-establishing the
occurrence of an in-service injury or disease.225
Daniel R. Gilbert served in the U.S. Navy after a medical
examination and medical history report revealed no psychiatric
defects.226  After his military service, he was diagnosed with, and
treated for, major depression and alcohol abuse and dependence.227
During treatment, Mr. Gilbert admitted he had experienced
depression and thoughts of suicide throughout his life, that he had
abused drugs and alcohol since he was a teenager, and that he had
continued to abuse alcohol during his military service.228 After he
217. O'Bryan, 771 F.3d at 1380.
218. Id. at 1381.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. 38 U.S.C. § 1111 (2012).
222. Id.
223. 749 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
224. 557 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
225 See Gilbert, 749 F.3d at 1373 (upholding the decision reached in Holton
regarding the proper applicability of the presumption of soundness).
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filed a claim for service-connected disability benefits, multiple
examinations produced conflicting opinions about whether his
psychiatric condition was connected to service.229
VA denied service connection and the Board affirmed the denial.2 0
The Board explained that the presumption of sound condition
applied because no psychiatric condition had been recorded when
Mr. Gilbert entered military service.231 As to whether VA rebutted the
presumption, the Board found that VA had provided clear and
unmistakable evidence that the veteran's depression and substance
232thBorfonthtVabuse had pre-existed service. However, the Board found that VA
had failed to establish that military service had not aggravated the
veteran's psychiatric illness and, therefore, VA did not rebut the
presumption of sound condition.2 3
Nonetheless, the Board denied service connection because it found
that, although Mr. Gilbert's post-service psychiatric illness satisfied
the first element of service connection and the presumption of sound
condition established the second element, he had not established the
third element: proving that his disability was causally linked to his
service in the Navy.24 The Veterans Court affirmed the Board
decision and Mr. Gilbert appealed.235
Before the Federal Circuit, Mr. Gilbert argued that the
presumption of sound condition relieved him of the burden to
establish an in-service injury and to prove that such an injury was
causally linked to his current disability.236 The Federal Circuit
rejected this argument as foreclosed by its decision in Holton, where it
held that the presumption of sound condition relates to the second
element of a service-connection claim-the occurrence of an in-
service injury or disease.237
Mr. Gilbert attempted to distinguish Holton on the basis that he,
unlike the veteran in Holton, had a medical condition that existed
before his military service.2" The Federal Circuit rejected this
argument and reaffirmed that the presumption of sound condition
does not relate to the third element of service connection-the
229. Id. at 1371-72.







237. Id. at 1373 (quoting Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
238. Id.
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requirement that the veteran establish a causal nexus between a
current disability and military service.239
3. Compensation for Gulf War illnesses
As a general rule, pain alone does not constitute a "current...
disability" for which VA may grant service connection.2 40 Instead, to
qualify a claimant for service-connected isability compensation, pain
must limit the veteran's ability to function.241  In Mitchell v.
Shinseki,2"2 the Veterans Court held that "although pain may cause a
functional loss, pain itself does not constitute functional loss" for the
purpose of VA benefits.
2 43
Most compensation for disabilities arising from service is granted
under 38 U.S.C. § 1110, which governs basic entitlement to
compensation for disabilities suffered during military service.
However, § 1117 provides that VA will pay disability benefits "to a
Persian Gulf veteran with a qualifying chronic disability" if that
disability manifested on active duty during service in the Persian
Gulf.2  The definition of a "qualifying chronic disability" includes a
chronic disability resulting from "an undiagnosed illness," which may
manifest as "muscle pain" and 'joint pain. "245
In Joyner v. McDonald,246 veteran Tarell Joyner was treated twice for
neck pain during his service in the U.S. Marine Corps in the Persian
Gulf; however at his separation-from-service examination, his neck
was described as "normal."247 He later submitted a claim for disability
compensation for chronic neck pain, among other problems.24" The
RO denied the claim and the Board affirmed the denial on the basis
that Mr. Joyner did not have a currently diagnosed neck disability and
therefore could not meet the first requirement for service connection.249
On appeal to the Veterans Court, Mr. Joyner argued that VA only
analyzed his neck condition under 38 U.S.C. § 1110 and failed to
consider whether, as a Gulf War veteran, he might be entitled to
239. Id.
240. Sanchez-Benitez v. West, 13 Vet. App. 282, 285 (1999), vacated in part sub nom.
Sanchez-Benitez v. Principi, 259 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
241. 38 C.F.R. § 4.40 (2012).
242. 25Vet. App. 32 (2011).
243. Id. at 37.
244. 38 U.S.C. § 1117(a)(1) (2012).
245. Id. § 1117(a) (2) (A), (g)(4)-(5).
246. 766 F.3d 1393 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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service connection under § 1117.25 The Veterans Court assessed the
claim under § 1117, but in a single-judge decision, it affirmed VA's
denial of benefits reasoning that, under Mitchell, pain alone does not
constitute a disability for the purpose of VA benefits.25'
Mr. Joyner appealed to the Federal Circuit.25 2 At oral argument,
the government conceded that pain could constitute a disability
under § 1117 because it could be the manifestation of an
undiagnosed illness.253 However, the government argued that any
error in the Veterans Court decision was harmless.254 The Federal
Circuit disagreed, finding that "l[t] he Veterans Court's
pronouncement hat pain 'does not constitute a disability' pervades
its analysis."25 5 In an opinion authored by Judge Moore, the court
found that "the plain language of § 1117 makes clear that pain, such
as muscle pain or joint pain, may establish an undiagnosed illness
that causes a qualifying chronic disability."256 The court noted that
the implementing regulation also stated that "muscle pain" or 'joint
pain" could manifest an "undiagnosed illness."
25 7
The government also argued that under § 1117, a veteran had "to
demonstrate that a medical professional has eliminated all possible
diagnoses before a veteran can be compensated for a disability
stemming from an undiagnosed illness." '258
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument in favor of a more
limited reading of the statute, holding that a veteran did not need to
undergo exhaustive medical testing to then be "'diagnosed' with an
'undiagnosed illness' after all possible medical conditions have been
ruled out. ' 2 9 Instead, the court held that the statute and regulation
only require an evaluation and VA could not make a diagnosis
regarding the cause of the "qualifying chronic disability.' ' 260 In
support of this conclusion, Judge Moore noted that when VA
promulgated the final version of section 3.317 in 1995, it explained
250. Id.
251. Joyner v. Shinseki, No. 11-3700, 2013 WL 2157239, at *4 (Vet. App. May 20,
2013), vacated and remanded by 766 F.3d 1393 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
252. Joyner, 766 F.3d at 1394.




257. Id. (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(b)(4)-(5) (2014)).
258. Id.; see also 38 U.S.C. § 1117(a)(2) (2012) (implying that medical
examination of undiagnosed illnesses is necessary).
259. Joyner, 766 F.3d at 1395.
260. Id.
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that the regulation did not require that physicians test veteran
claimants for every possible condition, using all available medical
tests.261  At that time, VA had made it clear that the statute and
regulation required that "[p] hysicians should simply record all noted
signs and reported symptoms, document all clinical findings, and
provide a diagnosis where possible.262  Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit remanded Mr. Joyner's claim.263
4. Medical evidence required to sever service connection
Under section 3.105(d), service-connected benefits may be
terminated if the agency later realizes that the grant was a mistake:
the evidence must establish that it was a CUE, with the burden of
proof on the agency.2"4 The regulation states the severance may be
based on a change in diagnosis, as long as the agency obtains a
medical certification that, "in the light of all accumulated evidence,
the diagnosis on which service connection was predicated is clearly
erroneous."2 65 In Stallworth v. Shinseki,266 the Federal Circuit held that
a medical examiner did not have to use specific language when
certifying that a previous award of service-connected benefits was
clearly erroneous and should be severed.267
In 1975, Mr. Stallworth was awarded service-connected isability
benefits for schizophrenia, which was evaluated as fifty percent
disabling.268 For 17 months, he was frequently admitted to inpatient
psychiatric facilities, where medical professionals repeatedly
concluded that he was not suffering from any mental condition.269
Eventually, his treating physician concluded that Mr. Stallworth did
not suffer from schizophrenia.27 ° In 1977, four VA staff physicians at
the Biloxi VA Medical Center provided a certification stating that
there was no evidence Mr. Stallworth had a mental illness, that he was
"fully responsible for his behavior," and that he was using "deceptive
261. Id.
262. Id. (quoting Compensation for Certain Undiagnosed Illnesses, 60 Fed. Reg.
6660, 6662 (Feb. 3, 1995) (codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3)).
263. Id. at 1395-96.
264. 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(d) (2014).
265. Id. In addition, the "certification must be accompanied by a summary of the
facts, findings, and reasons supporting the conclusion." Id.
266. 742 F.3d 980 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
267. Id. at 984.
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practices" to manipulate transfers to various hospitals.271  The
physicians opined that the veteran's diagnosis of schizophrenia was
"in error and mistakenly made," and that his in-service psychotic
episode was the result of his admitted use of illegal drugs.272 VA
concluded that the award of benefits for schizophrenia was CUE and
severed service connection.273
Mr. Stallworth attempted to have his benefits restored, which the RO
denied.274 He appealed and, in 1981, the Board affirmed the denial of
restoration of service-connected benefits.275 In 2010, after extensive
adjudication including Mr. Stallworth's allegation that the severance of
service connection was based on CUE, the Board concluded there was
no CUE in the 1981 Board decision.276 It determined that the four
physicians who provided the severance certification had considered
"all of the accumulated evidence," as required.277
Mr. Stallworth appealed the 2010 Board decision to the Veterans
Court, asserting that the Board misinterpreted section 3.105(d).278
He argued that the 1977 certification was inadequate to support
severance because the diagnosis relied upon was clearly erroneous.27 9
The Veterans Court limited its review to a determination of whether
the 2010 Board decision correctly interpreted section 3.105(d) when
it reviewed whether there was CUE in the 1981 Board decision.28 1 It
concluded that the 2010 Board, in finding no CUE in the 1981 Board
decision, did not misapply or misinterpret section 3.105(d).281 The
Veterans Court affirmed the 2010 Board decision.282
On appeal, the Federal Circuit construed the veteran's argument
as requiring the certification of changed diagnosis to "use magic
words such as 'clearly erroneous' when providing an opinion
pursuant to [section] 3.105(d) ."28 The court distinguished the case
271. Id. at 981-82.







279. Stallworth v. Shinseki, No. 11-0952, 2012 WL 4882264, at *3 (Vet. App. Oct.




283. Stallworth, 742 F.3d at 983.
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on which the veteran relied, Andino v. Nicholson,84 because in that
case, the certification of changed diagnosis "was not based on a
consideration of all the accumulated evidence," whereas in the case
on appeal, the Board had explicitly found that all evidence was
considered.8 5 Regarding Andino, the Federal Circuit stated, "[w] e
therefore held that service connection could not be severed based on
a medical opinion that did not consider all accumulated evidence,
but we did not require the use of any particular certifying language."2 '
The court concluded that the plain language of the regulation
required that a subsequent change in diagnosis did not need to use
the specific language of the regulation to be a valid medical
certification.28 7 Accordingly, it affirmed the Veterans Court decision.2 88
D. Evaluating the Level of Compensation Provided
In 2014, the Federal Circuit issued two opinions involving disability
evaluations, as compared to three in 2013, none in 2012, and three in
2011.29 The government generally evaluates disability according to
the criteria in VA's Schedule for Rating Disabilities ("Rating
Schedule"), which is based on "average impairment in earning
capacity."29 ° If two evaluations are potentially applicable, "the higher
evaluation will be assigned if the disability picture more nearly
approximates the criteria required for that [evaluation]. Otherwise,
the lower [evaluation] will be assigned."291 The Rating Schedule has
hundreds of "diagnostic codes" detailing how to evaluate disabilities
of every body part and physical system on a scale from 0 percent to
100 percent disabling.29 2 When those codes are insufficient, there are
also provisions for extra-schedular ratings and special monthly
compensation to further tailor the monthly payments.298 The Rating
284. 498 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
285. Stallworth, 742 F.3d at 983 (citing Andino, 498 F.3d at 1373).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 983-84.
288. Id. at 984.
289. See Moshiashwili, Splendid Isolation, supra note 1, at 1485; Ridgway, Changing
Voices, supra note 1, at 1199. See generally Ridgway, Fresh Eyes, supra note I
(discussing the Federal Circuit's veterans law cases in 2012, none of which involved
disability evaluations).
290. 38 U.S.C. § 1155 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 4.1 (2014).
291. 38 C.F.R. § 4.7.
292. 38 U.S.C. § 1155 (requiring that diagnostic codes be increased on ten
percent increments); 38 C.F.R. § 4.1.
293. 38 C.F.R. § 3.321 (b) (extra-schedular); id. § 3.350 (special monthly compensation).
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Schedule and extra-schedular ratings illustrate how complex the VA
regulatory scheme can be.
1. Extra-schedular evaluation of multiple service-connected disabilities
Although disability evaluations are generally based on "average
impairment in earning capacity," in some unusual cases, VA's Rating
Schedule does not adequately describe the veteran's disability
picture. If the agency determines that this is the case and that the
disabling condition also causes related problems such as "'marked
interference with employment' or 'frequent periods of
hospitalization,"' then VA will consider whether the veteran should
be assigned an extra-schedular disability evaluation, "[t]o accord
justice."'294 In Johnson v. McDonald,295 the Federal Circuit held that VA
must consider a veteran's disabilities both individually and
collectively when determining whether that veteran is entitled to an
extra-schedular evaluation.296
Marvin 0. Johnson served on active duty in the U.S. Army from
May 1970 to December 1971.297 In 2008, he contacted VA to request
an increase in his benefits, asserting that his service-connected
disabilities had worsened and that he was entitled to a total disability
evaluation based on individual employability (TDIU) because he was
no longer able to work.298 At that time, he was receiving service-
connected disability benefits for several conditions, including
rheumatic heart disease, assessed as ten percent disabling, and
degenerative changes in both knees, each of which was evaluated as
ten percent disabling.299 The RO denied his claims and the Board
affirmed the decision, finding that Mr. Johnson was not entitled to
referral for extra-schedular consideration for either his knee
conditions or his heart condition.00
294. 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b)(1). But see Thun v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 111, 113, 116
(2008) (affirming denial of extra-schedular disability evaluation to veteran alleging
that he would have progressed further and earned more at his job, if not for his
PTSD), aff'd on other grounds, 572 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009). If the RO or the Board
determines that the Rating Schedule does not adequately represent a veteran's more
complex disability, it must refer the veteran's case to the Under Secretary for
Benefits or the Director of Compensation, who determines whether to assign an
extra-schedular ating. 38 C.F.R. § 3.321 (b) (1).
295. 762 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
296 Id. at 1365.
297. Johnson v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 237, 240 (2013) (en banc), rev'd sub nom.
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On appeal to the Veterans Court, he argued that the plain
language of section 3.321 (b) (1) required VA to consider his disabling
conditions both individually and collectively when determining
whether to refer him for extra-schedular consideration.30 ' The en
banc Veterans Court affirmed the Board decision, concluding that
the language of the regulation was ambiguous and that it was not
clear "whether an extraschedular evaluation is to be awarded solely
on a disability-by-disability basis or on the combined effect of a
veteran's service-connected disabilities.""0 2 Therefore, the Veterans
Court concluded that it was obliged, under Auer v. Robbins,"' to defer
to the agency's interpretation of the regulation.0 4
The decision was far from unanimous. Judge Moorman concurred
with the result but wrote a separate opinion, emphatically stating that
the plain language of the regulation "appears most easily construed
to convey only one meaning-that a veteran's collective service-
connected disabilities may be considered in determining whether
referral for an extra-schedular rating is warranted.""3 5  However,
Judge Moorman "reluctantly" recognized that Supreme Court
precedent forced the court to accept the agency's "plausible, even
though strained, alternative reading" and affirm the Board decision.
30 6
Three Veterans Court judges dissented.0 7 In a separate statement
that was longer than the majority opinion, Chief Judge Kasold stated
that the regulation at hand was not ambiguous.8 He concluded that
the plain language of section 3.321(b) (1) required VA to refer a
veteran for extra-schedular consideration if the rating schedule
provided inadequate compensation for service-connected isabilities,
either collectively or individually.3 9 Judge Davis also wrote a
dissenting opinion, in which Judge Bartley joined, agreeing with
Chief Judge Kasold but writing separately "to emphasize that [their]
dissent [was] grounded in the conviction that the language of
301. Id.
302. Id. at 243.
303. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
304. Johnson, 26 Vet. App. at 243 (citing Smith v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1344, 1349
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
305. Id. at 248 (Moorman,J., concurring in the result).
306. Id. at 251.
307. Id. at 252 (Kasold, C.J., dissenting); id. at 265 (Davis,J., dissenting) (joined by
Judge Bartley).
308. Id. at 254 (Kasold, C.J., dissenting). The majority opinion was only nine
pages long, id. at 239-48 (majority opinion), while Judge Kasold's dissent was
thirteen pages long, id. at 252-65 (Kasold, C.J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 255-57 (Kasold, C.J., dissenting).
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[section] 3.321(b) unambiguously refute[d] the interpretation
advanced by the [government] .
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with Mr. Johnson that "[t] he
plain language of [section] 3.321(b) (1) provides for referral for
extra-schedular consideration based on the collective impact of
multiple disabilities." '' The court relied on the regulation's use of
the plural "evaluations" and "disabilities" in explaining that the
regulation applies in the "exceptional case where the schedular
evaluations" are inadequate to compensate a veteran for service-
connected "disability or disabilities.""1 2 It also noted that this reading
was consistent with the language of the statute under which section
3.321(b) (1) was promulgated, which authorizes VA to establish "a
schedule of ratings of reductions in earning capacity from specific
injuries or combination of injuries.
' 313
The government argued that section 3.321(b) (1) dictates
consideration of each disability separately because the problem of
inadequate schedular evaluation for multiple disabilities is already
covered by 38 C.F.R. § 4.16's provision for TDIU.314 The court
rejected this argument, noting that TDIU is only available when a
veteran's disabilities combine to preclude employment, and
described section 3.321(b) (1) as having a "gap-filling function[, ...
account[ing] for situations in which a veteran's overall disability
picture establishes something less than total unemployability, but
where the collective impact of a veteran's disabilities are nonetheless
inadequately represented.3 15  Accordingly, the court reversed and
remanded to the Veterans Court.16
Judge O'Malley wrote a separate opinion concurring with the
majority's analysis and result, but noting that "if the regulation here
were deemed sufficiently ambiguous to require application of Auer
deference, I believe this is a case in which the wisdom of continued
adherence to that principle should be reconsidered."317 She observed
that several Supreme Court Justices had expressed concern about the
validity of deferring to an agency's interpretation of its regulations,
310. Id. at 265 (Davis, J., dissenting).
311. Johnson v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
312. Id. (emphasis added) (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b) (1) (2014)).
313. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1155 (2012)).
314. Id. at 1366.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1366-67 (O'Malley, J., concurring) (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452 (1997)).
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and that the topic was even more problematic in the context of
veterans benefits, where VA has a very different role as compared to
other federal agencies.18
2. Evaluation of minor joint groups under diagnostic code 5003
In Spicer v. Shinseki,319 the Federal Circuit considered whether a
single minor joint could meet diagnostic code (DC) 5003's
requirement that a "group of' minor joints experience limited
motion from arthritis before a compensable disability evaluation
could be assigned.2°
Veteran Stephen R. Spicer served in the U.S. Navy from February
1984 to February 1987.321 During service, he fractured his left little
finger, which required surgery and eventually resulted in joint
fusing of the finger.322  Several decades after service, he was
diagnosed with arthritis of the distal interphalangeal (DIP) joint in
the left little finger.3 23  The RO granted service connection but
denied a compensable disability evaluation, and Mr. Spicer
appealed.324 The Board denied the claim, finding that Mr. Spicer
did not meet the criteria for a compensable evaluation under DCs
5227 or 5230, although it conceded that his arthritis caused pain
and limitation of motion.25
On appeal to the Veterans Court, Mr. Spicer argued that the Board
erred when it failed to consider DC 5003, which assigns a 10 percent
disability evaluation when arthritis affects "a major joint" or "a group
of minor joints."3 26 He argued that the regulation defining "groups
of minor joints" did not specify that multiple minor joints be
affected.3 2' The Veterans Court rejected this interpretation of the
regulation, concluding that (1) "the DIP joint is not a major joint or
minor joint group for the purpose of [evaluating] disabilities from
arthritis" and (2) the Board's failure to consider DC 5003 was
318. Id. at 1367.
319. 752 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
320. Id. at 1369 (interpreting 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a(5003) (2013)).
321. Id. at 1368.
322. Id. at 1369.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. (ruling out section 4.71a, diagnostic codes 5227 ("little finger, ankylosis
of"), and 5230 ("little finger, limitation of motion")).
326. Id.
327. Id. (citing 38 C.F.R. § 4.45(f) (2014)).
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harmless because it did not apply in this case."' Accordingly, it
affirmed the Board's decision.329
Mr. Spicer appealed to the Federal Circuit, continuing to argue
that arthritis in a single DIP joint can result in limitation of motion
that affects "a group of minor joints" and thus it qualifies for a 10
percent evaluation under DC 5003.330 He asserted that the regulation
did not provide any guidance to VA about how to evaluate a disability
that affects only one minor joint rather than a group of joints.31
Furthermore, he argued that if the court found the regulation to be
ambiguous, the benefit-of-the-doubt presumption required it to
resolve any interpretive doubt in favor of the veteran and adopt his
interpretation.3 32 The government supported the Veterans Court's
interpretation that DC 5003 unambiguously required limitation in
more than one minorjoint.
333
The Federal Circuit rejected the Mr. Spicer's argument. It noted
that section 4.45(f), which preceded DC 5003 in the rating
schedule, provided:
[fWor the purpose of rating disability from arthritis.... multiple
involvements of the interphalangeal, metacarpal and carpal joints
of the upper extremities, the interphalangeal, metatarsal and tarsal
joints of the lower extremities, the cervical vertebrae, the dorsal
vertebrae, and the lumbar vertebrae, are considered groups of
minorjoints .... 334
Accordingly, it held that "[t]he plain language of DC 5003, read in
view of section 4.45(f), makes clear that 'a minor joint group is
affected' only when two or more joints suffer from limitation of
motion. '3 5  The court also held that the regulation was not
ambiguous and, therefore, it need not invoke "the Supreme Court's
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 1370 (emphasis added) (referencing 38 C.F.R. § 4.45(f)).
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1370; see Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994) (ruling against the
Government where the statutory text and "reasonable inferences from it" supported
the veteran's position); see also Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct.
1197, 1206 (2011) (affirming that "provisions for benefits to members of the Armed
Services are to be construed in the beneficiaries' favor" (quoting King v. St. Vincent's
Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220 n.9 (1991))); Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (holding that "[tihe VA disability compensation system is not meant to
be ... a stratagem to deny compensation to a veteran who has a valid claim").
333. Spicer, 752 F.3d at 1370.
334. Id. (citing 38 C.F.R. § 4.45(f) (2013)).
335. Id. (citing Lockheed Corp. v. Widnall, 113 F.3d 1225, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
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mandate that 'interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran's
favor." 6 As a result, it affirmed the Veterans Court decision."'
Spicer is a good example of the results of a clear regulation. Both
levels of agency decision-making and judicial review interpreted the
regulations in the same way. The Federal Circuit relied on the plain
language of the regulation, thereby avoiding the need to invoke
complex, potentially conflicting canons of regulatory interpretation."'
3. Evaluating compensation paid when a veteran is incarcerated for a ftlony
When a veteran who is receiving service-connected disability
compensation is incarcerated for a felony conviction for more than
60 days, VA is required by statute to reduce compensation payments
to the 10 percent level, as of the 61st day of the veteran's
incarceration.39 In Wilson v. Gibson,4' the Federal Circuit held that
the Veterans Court correctly determined that calculation of
reduction of compensation payments resulting from a veteran's
incarceration starts on the date of conviction and not on the date
that all post-conviction remedies are exhausted.34'
The veteran in Wilson, John David Wilson, Jr., served honorably in
the U.S. Navy and was later awarded benefits for several service-
connected disabilities, evaluated as 70 percent disabling.42 In June
2001, he was convicted of two felonies and in October 2001, he began
to serve two concurrent life sentences.43 Although Mr. Wilson
notified VA in April 2000 that he was currently incarcerated, the
agency was not informed about his felony convictions until February
2002."'4 Later that month, VA sent Mr. Wilson a letter notifying him
that his compensation payments were being reduced from the 70
percent level to the 10 percent level, effective December 20, 2001,
which was the sixty-first day after he started serving his life
sentences.345 Between December 20, 2001, and February 2002, when
VA was informed that the veteran was serving life sentences for felony
convictions, the agency mistakenly overpaid Mr. Wilson by
336. Id. at 1371 (quoting Gardner, 513 U.S. at 118).
337. Id.
338. Id. at 1370-71.
339. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1114 (2012) (listing compensation rates for 2012); id.
§ 5313(a) (1) (mandating decreased compensation to incarcerated felons).
340. 753 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
341. Id. at 1368.
342. Id. at1364.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 1365.
345. Id.
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$15,464.50.141 VA sought repayment of this amount and the veteran
applied for a waiver of overpayment, which was denied.1
47
Before the Veterans Court, Mr. Wilson argued that a conviction is
final under § 5313(a) (1) only after a claimant has exhausted his
attempts to obtain federal habeas corpus relief.3" The Veterans
Court rejected this argument and affirmed the Board's decision.1
49
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Veterans Court's
statutory interpretation, holding that the plain language of the
statute and its implementing regulation clearly required that a
payment reduction was calculated based upon "conviction" and not
"final conviction."350 The court observed, "[w]hen Congress wants to
trigger events upon a final conviction, it knows how to do so, and
does so explicitly. ' 35' The court noted that the plain language of the
statute mandated that reduction of compensation begin "'on the
sixty-first day of such incarceration"' and not on "a date upon which a
person had exhausted all available post-conviction avenues of
relief."3 52  Accordingly, the court affirmed the Veterans Court's
interpretation of § 5313(a) (1) and rejected Mr. Wilson's argument
that the overpayment was invalid.353
E. Effective Date of Service Connection
In general, an award of VA benefits has an effective date that is
established based on the facts of the case, but-with very few







350. Id. at 1366-68 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.665(m) (2013)) (anticipating that if a
conviction is overturned on appeal, VA must reimburse withheld benefits to the
vindicated veteran).
351. Id. at 1367.
352. Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1) (2012)).
353. Id. at 1368. The Federal Circuit also dismissed Mr. Wilson's challenge to the
Board's denial of a waiver of overpayment because the veteran did not challenge the
legality of the statute but, instead, asked the court to reweigh the facts, which is
beyond its jurisdiction. Id. (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2)). The court also dismissed
the veteran's challenge to the Board's denial of his claim of entitlement to a TDIU
evaluation, which was not on appeal to the Veterans Court and, therefore, not
subject to review by the Federal Circuit. Id. (citing Guillory v. Shinseki, 669 F.3d
1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
354. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a).
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1. Effective date in a claim for service connection for PTSD
To determine the effective date of claims reopened on the basis of
newly-acquired service department records, VA regulations provide
that such an award "is effective on the date entitlement arose or the
date VA received the previously decided claim, whichever is later, or
such other date as may be authorized by the provisions of this part
applicable to the previously decided claim."355  In Young v.
McDonald,16 the Federal Circuit held that lay evidence is insufficient
to establish the effective date for service connection for post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and that medical evidence is
required to establish the PTSD diagnosis.35 v Like an original claim,
"the effective date of an award [of benefits] based on... a claim
reopened after [an earlier] final adjudication. .. shall be fixed in
accordance with the facts found, but shall not be earlier than the date
of receipt of application therefore."358
In this case, veteran Robert G. Young served in the U.S. Army as a
combat engineer from October 1965 to August 1967, including a tour
of duty in Vietnam.5 9 In 1984, he submitted a claim for VA disability
benefits for "anxiety," "bad nerves" and being "unable to adjust to
society."36 This was interpreted as a claim for service connection for
PTSD, which was denied when the veteran failed to report for a VA
medical examination.61 In May 1989, a VA psychiatrist submitted a
letter to the RO stating that Mr. Young had been under his care since
March 1989 and that he was suffering from PTSD.362 The claim was
denied because there was no evidence of an in-service stressor that
would have caused his PTSD 63
Mr. Young's attempts to reopen his claim were denied in 1992,
1993, 1995, and 1997.36 Mr. Young's claim was finally reopened in
1998 based on newly-acquired service department records that
established an in-service stressor adequate to support a diagnosis of
PTSD.65 VA awarded service connection for PTSD, which was
evaluated as 100 percent disabling, and effective August 1992, the
355. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) (3) (2014).
356. 766 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
357. Id. at 1353.
358. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a).
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date the agency received the veteran's request to reopen the
previously-denied claim. 66
Mr. Young disagreed with the assigned effective date, arguing that
service connection should have been granted from when he first
submitted his claim in 1984.367 On appeal, the Board concluded that
the correct effective date was the later of (1) the date VA received the
original claim in 1984, or (2) the date the veteran's entitlement to
service connection arose.36' The Board found that the veteran was
not entitled to service connection for PTSD until March 1989, when
his psychiatrist started treatment, because it was the earliest date the
veteran was medically determined to be suffering from PTSD.3 69
Accordingly, the Board assigned March 1989 as the effective date for
service connection.7 °
On appeal, the Veterans Court affirmed the Board's decision,
relying on 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(0, which provides that "[s]ervice
connection for [PTSD] require[d] medical evidence diagnosing the
condition. 371 The court concluded that Mr. Young's lay statements
in 1984 were not relevant to determining the date entitlement to
service connection for PTSD arose because the regulation clearly
required a medical diagnosis.72 In this case, the VA psychiatrist's
letter evidencing PTSD treatment since March 1989 was the earliest
available medical diagnosis.
373
Mr. Young appealed, arguing that the regulation only dictates
whether service connection for PTSD should be awarded, not when
entitlement arises.374 The Federal Circuit disagreed, observing that
"VA has long required a medical diagnosis of PTSD to establish
service connection, as it did when [the veteran] filed his claim in
1984."3 7' The Federal Circuit noted that the regulation includes and
366. Id.
367. Id. at 1350-51. For clarity, procedural aspects of the veteran's argument that
are not relevant here have been omitted from this summary.
368. Id. at 1351.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2014)).
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 1351-52. The veteran also argued that the Veterans Court should not
have applied 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f), which was first promulgated in 1993, to his claim,
which arose in 1984. Id. at 1354 (citing Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 397
F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
375. Id. at 1354.
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defines the conditions for entitlement, which necessarily dictate the
effective date. 6
The court also noted and appeared to accept the government's
concession that a retrospective diagnosis could be acceptable, but was
not present in this case because the VA psychiatrist who diagnosed
PTSD said nothing about the veteran's symptoms before March
1989.377 The court observed that, apart from the requirements of
section 3.304(f), precedent provides that lay evidence alone, without
a retrospective medical diagnosis, is not sufficient to establish a
diagnosis of PTSD.378  Although simple and observable medical
conditions-such as a broken leg-may be diagnosed by lay persons,
PTSD falls into the category of disabilities that are complex and
require medical diagnosis.379 The court concluded that "38 C.F.R.
§ 3.304(0 requires a diagnosis of PTSD by a medical professional,
and there is no question raised as to its validity. 3 8 0 Accordingly, it
affirmed the Veterans Court decision.
2. Effect of new and material evidence on finality under 38 C.ER. § 3.156(b)
Although a denied claim will generally become final if not
appealed, a veteran "may reopen a finally adjudicated claim by
submitting new and material evidence. "382 The regulation also
provides that if the veteran files a timely appeal and the agency
receives new and material evidence before the appeal period ends, or
before an appellate decision is issued, then such evidence will be
considered as having been filed with the claim that was pending at
the beginning of the appeal period.3
376. Id. at 1352.
377. Id. at 1352-54; see alsoJandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (allowing lay evidence of testimony to form the basis of a retrospective
diagnosis of PTSD).
378. Young, 766 F.3d at 1352-54.
379. Id. at 1353.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 1355.
382. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2014). The regulation provides the following
definitions: "New evidence means existing evidence not previously submitted to
agency decision makers. Material evidence means existing evidence that, by itself or
when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact
necessary to substantiate the claim." Id. It also explains that "[n]ew and material
evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the
time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and must raise
a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim." Id.
383. Id. § 3.156(b).
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Two previous Federal Circuit cases are relevant to interpreting 38
C.F.R. § 3.156(b). First, in Bond v. Shinseki,3 4 VA granted service
connection for PTSD and, within a year, the veteran submitted
additional medical records and requested an increased disability
evaluation. Instead of applying section 3.156(b) and determining
whether the additional records were new and material evidence, VA
considered Richard D. Bond's submission as a new claim and granted
it with an effective date corresponding to when the additional records
were submitted.86
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with Mr. Bond that the
effective date should have been the date of his initial claim.3 87 It
explained that VA's failure to make the section 3.156(b)
determination as to whether the additional records were new and
material evidence meant that the initial decision never became
final-in other words, it remained pending until the section 3.156(b)
determination was made.88 The court held that section 3.156(b)
requires VA to first consider whether new and material evidence is
related to a previous claim, before categorizing it as a new claim.38 9 It
pointed out that VA's characterization of the veteran's additional
evidence as a new claim "[did] not foreclose the possibility that [the
submission] may have also contained new and material evidence
pertaining to" the earlier claim.39
In the second case, Williams v. Peake,"9' VA denied service
connection for a nervous condition without informing the veteran
about its decision.392 The claimant, Vernon D. Williams, later filed a
second claim for a nervous condition, which VA also denied, but this
time informed him of its decision.39 3 Mr. Williams did not appeal that
decision.394 Fifteen years later, the claim was reopened and service
connection was granted with an effective date based on the request to
reopen.395 Mr. Williams argued that the effective date should have
been the date of the first claim because VA never informed him
384. 659 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
385. Id. at 1363.
386. Id. at 1363-64.
387. Id. at 1366-69.
388. Id. at 1367-69.
389. Id. at 1367-68.
390. Id. at 1368.
391. 521 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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about the denial and, therefore, that claim remained pending.96 The
Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit both disagreed, explaining that
the denial of the second claim, about which Mr. Williams was
informed, terminated the pending status of the first claim.397
Both Bond and Williams informed the Federal Circuit's analysis in
Beraud v. McDonald.39 Leonard Beraud served in the U.S. Navy from
July 1974 to July 1977, with additional service afterwards in the Naval
Reserve.9 In 1985, he submitted a claim for service connection for
headaches based on an in-service head injury.4"' In November 1985,
the RO sent him a letter explaining that it was having trouble finding
his service medical records and asking him to identify his reserve
units so it could obtain the information from them.4 1
Before Mr. Beraud could respond, VA denied the claim for lack of
evidence, informing him of its decision on December 9, 1985.402 A
week later, on December 16, 1985, Mr. Beraud responded to the
request for information, notifying VA as to the location of his missing
service medical records.4 3 VA never responded to this letter and
apparently did not obtain the records.4 4 Mr. Beraud did not appeal
the December 1985 denial of his headache claim.
40 5
Four years later, Mr. Beraud asked VA to reopen the headache
claim.40 6 In February 1990, the RO reopened the claim and denied it
on the merits, finding that Mr. Beraud did not incur his headache
disorder during his military service.407 The RO did not refer to Mr.
Beraud's December 1985 letter explaining how to locate his missing
service medical records, nor did it refer to the missing records
themselves.408 Mr. Beraud did not appeal this denial, and it also
became final.4 9 The RO denied his claim on the merits in 1990 after
396. Id.
397. Id. at 1350-51.
398. 766 F.3d 1402 (Fed. Cir. 2014).





404. Id.; see also Beraud v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 313, 322 (2013) (Bartley, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "the veteran's Naval Reserve medical records referenced in
his 1985 submission appear to be yet unobtained"), rev'd sub nom. Beraud v.
McDonald, 766 F.3d 1402 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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he requested that his claim be reopened, which he did not appeal.4 0
In 1992 and 2002, he requested that VA reopen the claim, but the
RO denied both requests on the grounds that Mr. Beraud had not
submitted sufficiently new and material evidence.41'
In August 2004, Mr. Beraud submitted an informal claim for
service connection for the same headache condition and, based on a
medical opinion that referenced a 1975 in-service head injury, VA
granted the claim.41 2 The agency assigned an effective date of August
27, 2004, the date he submitted the informal claim.413 Mr. Beraud
appealed, arguing that the effective date should be in 1985, when he
filed his original claim.41 4 The Board disagreed, finding that the 1990
denial had extinguished the pendency of the 1985 submission
because the two claims were identical.4 5
On appeal to the Veterans Court, Mr. Beraud argued that his 1985
claim had never become final because VA never obtained and
assessed the missing medical records he had identified in his
December 1985 letter.416 He asserted that VA's failure to make the
required determination under section 3.156(b) as to whether those
records were new and material meant hat the 1985 claim remained
pending.4 17 A divided panel of the Veterans Court affirmed the
Board's decision.41" Although the majority acknowledged the
regulations and case law about pending unadjudicated claims, it
relied on Williams and concluded that if the 1985 claim had been
pending, it became final when VA notified the veteran in 1990 that it
had denied his headache claim.41 '9 The Veterans Court explained
that "the RO is presumed to have considered all the evidence of
record at the time of its February 1990 decision, including the
[veteran]'s December 1985 letter. '420  The majority stated further
stated that its "holding does not deprive claimants of the opportunity
410. Id.
411. Id. at 1403-04.







419. Id. (citing Williams v. Peake, 521 F.3d 1348, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
420. See Beraud v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 313, 320 n.4 (2013) (citing Gonzales v.
West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2000)), rev'd sub nom. Beraud v. McDonald, 766
F.3d 1402 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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to challenge VA's procedural failures; it merely restricts the method
of doing so to a challenge to the subsequent adjudication."
42'
Judge Bartley dissented, opining that the majority "wrongly
limit[ed] the effect of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b)" because the regulation
mandates that a claim remains pending until VA actually considers
whether the additional evidence is new and material.422 In this case,
it appeared that the missing records referenced in the veteran's 1985
letter had not been obtained in 1990-nor, as Judge Bartley noted-
did it appear that the missing records had ever been obtained.
4 21
Judge Bartley concluded that the Veterans Court should remand the
matter to the Board to determine whether section 3.156(b) applies
because the veteran reasonably raised section 3.156(b) in his 1985
submission, but the Board did not address this section when it
determined the veteran's effective date of benefits.
4 24
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Mr. Beraud asserted that, under
Bond, his 1985 claim remained pending despite the 1990 decision
because VA never determined whether the medical records identified
in the December 1985 letter were new and material evidence under
section 3.156(b).425 VA responded that Bond did not apply in this
case because it did not concern the effect of a subsequent final
decision on a claim identical to a prior pending claim, and that Bond
did not hold that VA's failure to make a section 3.156(b)
determination negates the finality of an unappealed later decision.426
Instead, the agency argued that Williams should trump Bond and
control the outcome.427
The Federal Circuit disagreed with VA's reasoning, noting that
Williams did "not involve the submission of new evidence within the
one-year appeal period" or VA's duty to consider such evidence
under section 3.156(b).4 8 It explained that, in Williams, the agency's
subsequent decision on an identical claim cured any prejudice
because the veteran eventually "received the notice [and] ...
understood how his claim was ultimately resolved."4 29 The Federal
Circuit reasoned that, for Mr. Beraud, the 1990 decision cured the
421. Id. at 319.
422. Id. at 322 (BartleyJ., dissenting).
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Beraud v. McDonald, 766 F.3d 1402, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 1405-06.
429. Id. at 1406.
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notice problem but did not repair VA's failure to make the new-and-
material determination under section 3.156(b), an obligation the
court described as "not optional."430
The court also rejected the agency's argument that the Veterans
Court correctly presumed that the 1990 decision was based on all
relevant evidence, including the missing medical records.43 ' It
reasoned that, based on Bond, the presumption did not apply when
VA had not made the required section 3.156(b) determination.432
Accordingly, it reversed and remanded the claim.433
Judge Lourie dissented, asserting that "Williams is not undermined
by Bond, and Williams should control in this case.43 4 He noted that
"[a]lthough Williams did not concern finality in the context of
[section] 3.156(b), there is no reason to limit Williams to cases
involving notice errors, and our cases have not limited Williams in
such a way." 43' He explained that Bond, unlike Williams, did not
involve a pending claim that was later resolved by a later decision,
and should not, therefore, control the result in this case.436 Judge
Lourie asserted that in cases such as this, the appropriate way for the
veteran to challenge VA's failure to properly adjudicate a prior
unappealed claim was to file a motion alleging CUE.437 He expressed
his concern that the majority's decision could force the agency "to
reopen determinations that were closed by final decisions that were
adjudicated on the merits.
438
3. Consequences of newly discovered service records on effective date
In general, the effective date for an award of service-connected
benefits is "the date of receipt of the claim or the date entitlement
arose, whichever is the later. '4 9 This rule also applies to reopened
claims, for which the effective date is the later of the date of receipt
of the request to reopen or the "date entitlement arose. "4°
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 1406-07 (citing Bond v. Shinseki, 659 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
433. Id. at 1407.
434. Id. (Lourie,J., dissenting).
435. Id. at 1408 (citing Charles v. Shinseki, 587 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
436. Id.
437. Id. at 1408-09.
438. Id. at 1409.
439. 38 C.F.R. § 3.400 (2014); see 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a) (2012); Akers v. Shinseki,
673 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
440. 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(r).
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However, an exception arises when, after a claim has been decided,
newly-obtained relevant service department records are associated
with the claims file." In such a case, VA is required to reconsider the
veteran's claim regardless of whether the evidence is determined to
be "new and material.""2 "In other words, section 3.156(c) serves to
place a veteran in the position he would have been had the VA
considered the relevant service department record before the
disposition of his earlier claim.""' If applicable, section 3.156(c) also
establishes different effective dates in certain circumstances.4"
In Blubaugh v. McDonald, 4 the Federal Circuit held that the
effective date of service-connection for a reopened claim for PTSD
was the date the veteran submitted the new and material evidence
that led to reopening and granting his claim, not the earlier date on
which he unsuccessfully tried to reopen the claim." 6  Daniel C.
Blubaugh served in the U.S. Army from January 1964 to January 1966,
including service in Vietnam.447  In 1988, he claimed service
connection for PTSD but was denied because his VA psychological
examination did not result in a diagnosis of PTSD."s He did not
appeal this decision, and it became final.44
In 1992, Mr. Blubaugh requested that VA reopen his claim for
service connection for PTSD.4" The agency obtained new evidence-
a Department of the Army (DA) Form 20 that listed Vietnam service
dates-and so it reopened the claim and provided Mr. Blubaugh with
another examination.45' This examination also did not result in a
diagnosis of PTSD and VA denied the claim again.452 It also noted
that Mr. Blubaugh did not have a confirmed stressor event, which is
another requirement for granting service connection for PTSD.453
On July 25, 2008, Mr. Blubaugh submitted a second request to
reopen his claim.454 For the first time, he submitted a statement
441. Id. § 3.156(c) (1).
442. See id. (referencing section 3.156 (a)).
443. Blubaugh v. McDonald, 773 F.3d 1310, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
444. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.156(c) (3)-(4).
445. 773 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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describing his experiences in Vietnam and his difficulties after
service.455  There was evidence of a medically-documented PTSD
diagnosis, which had also been unavailable during the previous
adjudications of the claim.456 Based on this new information, the RO
reopened the claim and adjudicated it on the merits, granting service
connection for PTSD with an effective date of July 25, 2008."'7
Mr. Blubaugh submitted a Notice of Disagreement, asserting he
was entitled to an earlier effective date.458 The RO continued the
denial, explaining that the initial claim and the first request to
reopen were not supported by a diagnosis of PTSD and, furthermore,
did not include evidence of a confirmable stressor event.459 Mr.
Blubaugh appealed to the Board, which affirmed the RO decision.460
On appeal to the Veterans Court, Mr. Blubaugh argued that the
Board should have applied 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) and reconsidered
the claim when it obtained the DA Form 20 and associated it with
his claims file for the first time.4 1 The Veterans Court concluded
that the regulation did not apply in this case because the DA Form
20 was already associated with the claims file before the 1993
decision.462 VA's duty to reconsider the claim arose when the
agency obtained the service record, not in 2008.463 Accordingly, it
affirmed the Board's decision."
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Mr. Blubaugh argued that, under
section 3.156(c), VA was required to consider whether he was entitled
to an effective date earlier than his request to reopen the claim
because (1) VA made a decision on his claim without all the relevant
records, and (2) it later granted the benefits requested, based in
whole or in part on those records.4 65 The Federal Circuit rejected
this argument.466 It explained that " [s]ubsection (c) (1) is a separate
and distinct provision from subsections (c) (3) and (c) (4)," which











465. Id. at 1313-14.
466. Id. at 1314.
467. Id.
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court noted that "[t]he language and overall structure" of this section
of the regulation emphasizes "that [section] 3.156(c) (1) requires the
VA to reconsider only the merits of a veteran's claim whenever it
associates a relevant service department record with his claims file
(provided that the service record was unavailable when the veteran's
claim was filed)."" It concluded that VA was only required to
consider an earlier effective date under subsections (c) (3) and (c) (4)
if the agency's section 3.156(c) (1) reconsideration on the merits
resulted in a grant of benefits.469
The court explained that, in this case, the relevant and newly-
obtained evidence that required VA to reopen and reconsider the
claim under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) (1) was the DA Form 20 in 1993.470
However, that evidence did not sufficiently support a grant of service
connection: at the time of the 1993 decision, the veteran still did not
have a PTSD diagnosis or a confirmable stressor event.471 The claim
was finally granted based on new and material evidence under 38
C.F.R. § 3.156(a)-a medical diagnosis of PTSD and new statements
about a confirmable stressor-and not based on newly obtained
service records under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c).472
The Federal Circuit concluded that VA did not have an obligation
to reconsider the veteran's claim in light of his DA Form 20 because
in 1993, the VA had reconsidered and again denied the veteran's
claim despite having a newly associated service record.473
Accordingly, it affirmed the decision of the Veterans Court.474
F. Procedure
As discussed in the Introduction and as noted in previous years,475
veterans' benefits law is procedurally complex and it is therefore not
surprising that many of the Veterans Court decisions reviewed by the







474. Id. at 1315.
475. See generally Ridgway, New Complexities, supra note 17, at 252 (describing how
the veterans' benefits system struggles to balance complexity and informality).
476. Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 1, at 1207 (observing the significance of
procedure to the veterans benefits system based on the fact that while most of the
Federal Circuit's published decisions in 2011 reviewed unpublished, single-judge
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1. Equitable tolling of deadline to appeal to veterans court
a. Timing of equitable tolling
In Checo v. Shinseki,47 7 the Federal Circuit addressed the criteria for
pausing-tolling-the running of the period in which a Notice of
Appeal ("NOA") must be submitted to the Veterans Court.478 When a
claimant files an untimely NOA, the Veterans Court may consider
whether equitable tolling is warranted.479 Generally, equitable tolling
applies only where a claimant has been prevented from timely filing
an NOA despite exercising due diligence."
One example of a situation that warrants equitable tolling is
extraordinary circumstances beyond a claimant's control.48 ' The
three-part test to determine whether a given situation constitutes
"extraordinary circumstances" sufficient to justify equitable tolling,
which was first outlined in McCreary v. Nicholson,482 requires that: (1)
"the extraordinary circumstances must be beyond the [veteran's]
control"; (2) "the [veteran] must demonstrate that the untimely filing
was a direct result of the extraordinary circumstances"; and (3) "the
[veteran] must exercise 'due diligence' in preserving his [or her]
appellate rights, meaning that a reasonably diligent [person], under
the same circumstances, would not have filed an appeal within the
120-day judicial-appeal period."
4 3
In Checo, the Board denied an increased evaluation for the
veteran's service-connected spine condition on July 6, 2011.484 The
time limit to appeal to the Veterans Court is 120 days485 but the
veteran, Cerise Checo, was homeless when the decision was issued
and did not receive notice of the Board's denial until October 6,
2011, 91 days into the 120-day appeal period.486 She eventually filed a
NOA with the Veterans Court on December 7, 2011, 33 days after the
120-day time limit had expired.487 She explained that she had not
Veterans Court decisions, its decisions in three of the four procedural-related cases
resulted in opinions that divided the entire Veterans Court).
477. 748 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
478. Id. at 1375.
479. Bove v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 136, 137, 140-41 (2011) (per curiam).
480. Id. at 140.
481. Id.
482. 19 Vet. App. 324 (2005), affd on r'hg, 20 Vet. App. 86 (2006).
483. Id. at 332.
484. Checo v. Shinseki, 748 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
485. 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) (2012).
486. Checo, 748 F.3d at 1375.
487. Id.
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received mail since 2009 because financial hardship left her homeless
and residing in shelters and temporary housing.
48s
The matter was referred to a panel of the Veterans Court to
determine, when a claimant demonstrates extraordinary
circumstances, "(1) during what portion of the time to file a Notice of
Appeal the appellant is required to demonstrate due diligence; and
(2) if due diligence is shown, what portion of the time to file a Notice
of Appeal is tolled"?..9
The Veterans Court presumed that homelessness constituted an
extraordinary circumstance in this case, and that Ms. Checo's
homelessness was a circumstance beyond her control.49 ° However, it
concluded she had not explained how her homelessness directly
caused her failure to file a timely NOA, nor had she demonstrated-
or even alleged-diligence during any part of the period between
when the Board issued its decision and when she filed her late
NOA.491 Accordingly, the Veterans Court dismissed the claim without
evaluating the questions for which the panel had been formed.492
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the veteran raised two
arguments. First, she asserted that the Veterans Court's practice of
raising timeliness issues sua sponte deprived the government of the
opportunity to waive the right to challenge the time limit on the
appeal period.493 She supported this argument by (1) noting that the
120-day filing limit is a non-jurisdictional time limit and should,
therefore, be waivable; (2) Congress could have expressly written that
§ 7266(a) was non-waivable but did not do so; (3) only the parties
should "present issues" at the adversarial level of the Veterans Court,
as opposed to the lower levels of adjudication within the pro-claimant
VA system; and (4) the time for filing an appeal for judicial review of
a Social Security decision is waivable and the two systems are
analogous and should be treated similarly in this respect.494
488. Id. at 1375-76.
489. Checo v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 130, 131 (2013), rev'd in part and vacated in
part, 748 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
490. Id. at 133.
491. Id. at 134-35.
492. Id. at 131.
493. Checo, 748 F.3d at 1376-77.
494. Id.; see also Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1204-05
(2011); Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19-21 (2005) ("[C]laim-processing
rules thus assure relief to a party properly raising them, but do not compel the same
result if the party forfeits them."); Bobbitt v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 547, 552 (2004)
("[Fliling an appeal to this Court is not an action within the non-adversarial,
manifestly pro-claimant veterans' benefits system. Rather, [it] ... is the first step in
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The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments, noting that there is
no case law affirmatively prohibiting the Veterans Court from raising
a non-jurisdictional limitation sua sponte and that the Supreme
Court has permitted district courts to raise non-jurisdictional statute
of limitations sua sponte.495 The court also concluded that the Veterans
Court acted within the "broad discretion" Congress had granted it
when it required a claimant to file a NOA within a certain time.496
Ms. Checo also asserted that the Veterans Court erred in ruling
that she was not entitled to equitable tolling.49 The Federal Circuit
restated the three-factor test established in McCreary and found, like
the Veterans Court, that the veteran's homelessness during part of
the appeal period satisfied the "extraordinary circumstance"
element.49 The court turned to the second element, stating:
We begin our inquiry by considering for which period Ms. Checo
needed to show such due diligence-during the entire 120-day
appeal, during the period of extraordinary circumstances (i.e.,
ending on October 6, 2011 [,] when she received a copy of the
decision), during the period between the end of the
extraordinary circumstances and the date of filing the NOA (i.e.,
between October 6, 2011[,] and December 7, 2011), or during
some other period.499
The court relied on the Second Circuit's approach in Harper v.
Ercole,5°° concluding that "due diligence must only be shown during
the requested tolling period, which can occur at any time during the
statutory period."'' It explained that "a court may suspend the
statute of limitations for the period of extraordinary circumstances
and determine timeliness by reference to the total untolled period
without requiring a further showing of diligence."52
The court adopted this approach, which it described as the "stop-
clock" method because the 120-day appeal period stops during
extraordinary circumstances and starts ticking again when the period
an adversarial process challenging the Secretary's decision on benefits." (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).
495. Checo, 748 F.3d at 1377.
496. Id.
497. Id. at 1378.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 1379 (footnotes omitted).
500. 648 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2011).
501. Checo, 748 F.3d at 1379. Harper held that tolling requirements must be
satisfied throughout the period to be tolled. Harper, 648 F.3d at 136.
502. Checo, 748 F.3d at 1379 (quoting Harper, 648 F.3d at 139).
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concludes.50 '  This use of a "stop-clock approach" overruled the
Veterans Court's previous application of McCreary that required a
claimant who experienced extraordinary circumstances to show due
diligence during the entire appeal period.5 4  The Federal Circuit
remanded the case to the Veterans Court to clarify an appropriate
due diligence standard and apply it to the veteran's claim.505
As to the McCreay element of direct causation, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the Veterans Court used the wrong legal standard
because, under the stop-clock approach, Ms. Checo only needed to
demonstrate that her homelessness caused her inability to file her
NOA during the period she sought to be tolled, i.e., the 91 days of
the appeal period during which she was homeless and unable to
receive mail.50 6 The court stated that "although Ms. Checo failed to
explain why her homelessness caused a delay between October 6,
2011," when she began to receive mail again, "and the end of the
appeal period, she did indeed explain why her homelessness caused a
delay during the 91-day period."' 7
Judge Mayer agreed with the majority that the Veterans Court
should have used the stop-clock approach and accepted Ms. Checo's
NOA as timely filed, but dissented from the majority's conclusion that
the Veterans Court had the authority to routinely raise, sua sponte,
the matter of whether a claimant filed a timely NOA.50 8 Judge Mayer
asserted that the Supreme Court's decision in Henderson ex rel.
Henderson v. Shinseki,°9 meant that the Veterans Court's practice of
screening all NOAs for timeliness and requesting justification for late
NOAs led to the Veterans Court raising an affirmative defense on
behalf of one of the parties, in a serious departure from the
governing principles of the adversary system.1° Judge Mayer noted
that the Veterans Court justified this practice by asserting that
allowing VA to waive the 120-day time limit would "cede some control
503. Id.
504. See id. at 1379-80 (adopting the stop-clock approach with support from
both parties).
505. Id. at 1381.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Id. at 1382 (MayerJ., dissenting in part).
509. 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011).
510. Checo, 748 F.3d at 1383; cf Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct 1826, 1833-34 (2012)
(affirming that only in exceptional circumstances may an appellate court bring up
procedural arguments "overlooked by the State in the District Court"); Henderson,
131 S. Ct. at 1203, 1206 (clarifying that the 120-day rule was an "important
procedural rule" but not a jurisdictional prerequisite).
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of the court's docket to the Secretary and permit arbitrary selection
of which veteran's late filing he finds worthy of waiver, a process
devoid of consistency, procedural regularity, and effective judicial
review.""' Judge Mayer described this rationale as "far-fetched" and
factually unsupported because the government will usually have every
incentive to timely raise a statute of limitations defense to resolve the
case quickly, rather than making arbitrary decisions.512
b. Evidence supporting reconsideration of equitable tolling
Under Rule 35 of the Veterans Court's Rules of Practice and
Procedure, an unsuccessful appellant can submit a motion requesting
that the Veterans Court reconsider its decision.513 This Rule specifies
that such a motion should "state the points of law or fact that the
party believes the Court has overlooked or misunderstood.
514
The Federal Circuit addressed this rule in Dixon v. Shinseki,5 15 where
it found that equitable tolling was not precluded merely because the
veteran filed an untimely notice of appeal.56 The court held that the
Veterans Court abused its discretion when it denied the veteran's
motion for an extension of the 120-day deadline to file his appeal and
concluded that enough unusual circumstances existed to avoid the
bar on additional evidence to support his motion for reconsideration.17
In Dixon, a VA RO denied Mr. Dixon's claim for disability benefits
and the Board affirmed that decision.518 In May 2008, Mr. Dixon
filed a pro se NOA to the Veterans Court, but he submitted it 60
days after that court's 120-day filing deadline had passed.519 In
August 2008, the Veterans Court dismissed the appeal, concluding
that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal because it
was untimely filed.520
Three years later, the Supreme Court in Henderson ex rel. Henderson
v. Shinseki held that the 120-day deadline was not a jurisdictional
requirement, but a "claim-processing rule[]" subject to equitable
511. Checo, 748 F.3d at 1383 (quoting Bove v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 136, 141
(2011) (per curiam)).
512. Id. at 1384.
513. U.S.VET. APP. R. 35.
514. U.S.VET. APP. R. 35(e)(1).
515. 741 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
516. Id. at 1375.
517- Id. at 1378-79.
518. Id. at 1370.
519. Id. (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) (2012)).
520. Id. at 1370-71.
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tolling in appropriate circumstances.5 2' Following this decision, the
Veterans Court issued an order applicable to veterans like Mr.
Dixon, whose appeals had been dismissed as untimely, allowing
them to file motions to recall the dismissal of their appeals if
equitable tolling applied.
22
Mr. Dixon filed a pro se motion asserting that equitable tolling
should be applied in his case because his disabilities, including
PTSD and gastrointestinal and respiratory conditions, prevented
him from timely filing his NOA.52  He then filed a supplemental
motion explaining that, during the appeal period, he believed he
was dying and was experiencing numerous panic attacks.24 He also
submitted a letter from the VA psychiatrist who had been treating
him since 2001 and who stated that the veteran had been "unable to
attend [to] or focus on the appeal process" during the time he
needed to submit his NOA.525
The Veterans Court acknowledged the VA psychiatrist's opinion
but found that the veteran had not established that his "failure to




Accordingly, it denied the motion for equitable tolling.527
At this point, Mr. Dixon retained attorneys who "promptly"
submitted a successful motion to extend the time to file a motion for
reconsideration of the denial of equitable tolling.5 28 The attorneys
requested a copy of the veteran's claims file from VA, which refused
to send a copy of the file but agreed to make it available for review at
VA's RO in Denver, although not until three days before the motion
for reconsideration was due.29 On that date, a legal assistant working
for the attorneys reviewed the claims file, although she alleged that
she was not provided with enough time to thoroughly review the file
521. Henderson exrel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011).
522. Bove v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 136, 140, 145-46 (2011) (per curiam).
523. See Dixon, 741 F.3d at 1371.
524. Id. (describing the veteran's panic attacks as stemming from his worry of his
enlarged lymph nodes, which proved to be cancer soon after).
525. Id. (alteration in original) (acknowledging the veteran had PTSD while
dealing with the appeals process).
526. Dixon v. Shinseki, No. 08-1475, 2012 WL 3291861, at *1 (Vet. App. Aug. 14,
2012) (quoting Barrett v. Principi, 363 F.3d 1316, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2004)), rev'd, 741
F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
527. Id. at *2.
528. Dixon, 741 F.3d at 1371.
529. Id. at 1371-72.
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and that VA would not provide her with copies in time to submit Mr.
Dixon's motion.53 °
The veteran's attorneys also attempted to obtain an additional
statement from the VA psychiatrist, clarifying his previous letter in
support of equitable tolling.53' However, VA contacted the veteran's
attorney and told him that VA regulations did not permit the
psychiatrist to sign the statement hat had been prepared.532
The day before the motion for reconsideration was due at the
Veterans Court, the veteran's attorneys requested a second extension
of time.533 They argued that a second extension was justified based
on "extraordinary circumstances," explaining that VA had refused to
timely provide documents and had prohibited the veteran's doctor
from providing evidence supporting the motion for reconsideration.534
The Veterans Court denied the motion on the basis that the
veteran did not have the right to submit documents from his claims
file or a declaration from his psychiatrist supporting his motion for
reconsideration.5 5 The court relied on Rule 35(e) (1) of its Rules of
Practice and Procedure, which stated that "a motion for
reconsideration.., must show that the Court has overlooked or
misunderstood a point of law or fact."536 The court explained that a
motion for reconsideration "must be based on the record at the time
of the decision.'537 Because the Veterans Court concluded that the
veteran could not "augment[] the record," it determined that VA's
actions preventing him from doing so did not justify a second
extension of time.53 8
Mr. Dixon appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the
Veterans Court abused its discretion when it denied a second
extension of time because VA had "actively obstructed" his efforts to
530. Id. at 1372 (explaining that the legal assistant also alleged she was monitored
while inspecting the claims file).
531. Id. (offering his opinion that the veteran's illness directly resulted in his




535. Id. at 1372-73.
536. Id. at 1372 (citing a non-precedential, single judge memorandum decision
handed down on October 10, 2012); see also U.S. VET. APP. R. 35 (e) (1) ("[A] motion
for.., reconsideration shall state the points of law or fact that the party believes the
Court has overlooked or misunderstood.").
537. Dixon, 741 F.3d at 1373.
538. Id. (alteration in original).
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obtain supporting documents in his claims file.539  The Federal
Circuit agreed, citing its decision in Barrett v. Nicholson,54° which held
that VA had an affirmative obligation "to come forward with" relevant
evidence "and to develop additional facts uniquely within [the
agency's] competence" regarding a veteran's entitlement to equitable
tolling.54 ' The Barrett Court had explained that this was because VA
usually has "superior access to a veteran's claim [s] file and the facts
bearing on jurisdiction."542
The Federal Circuit concluded that, despite its broad discretion to
interpret and apply its own rules, the Veterans Court had "no
reasonable justification" for denying a second extension of time. 43
The Federal Circuit noted that VA had a history of obstructing access
when veterans attempted to obtain VA medical records to support
their disability benefits claims and concluded that denying an
extension in such circumstances "serves only to reward delay and
obstruction by [VA]."
The Federal Circuit also held that "the Veterans Court erred to the
extent that it concluded that Rule 35(e) imposes an absolute
prohibition on the submission of clarifying evidence in support of
reconsideration of an equitable tolling decision."4 5 The court
found that such a reading of the rule failed to follow the Veterans
Court's own case law, which expressly permitted a veteran to submit
clarifying evidence when necessary for "a full and fair consideration
of ... [an] equitable tolling request" which required analysis of all
the relevant facts.546 The court noted that the Supreme Court's
Henderson decision had emphasized the unique, pro-claimant nature
of the veterans benefits adjudication system, as compared to
"ordinary civil ligation," and found that treating the 120-day filing
deadline as jurisdiction would "clash sharply" with its
Congressionally-designed solicitude."'
Therefore, because, in the equitable tolling context, the Veterans
Court is required to make factual determinations and because the
539. Id.
540. 466 F.3d 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
541. Dixon, 741 F.3d at 1373 (quoting Barrett, 466 F.3d at 1042).
542. Barrett, 466 F.3d at 1043.
543. Dixon, 741 F.3d at 1374.
544. Id. at 1373 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
545. Id. at 1375.
546. Id. (citing McCreary v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 86, 91 (2006)).
547. Id. at 1376; see also Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197,
1206 (2011) (considering the contradictory nature a strict reading would have on
beneficial veteran policies).
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period relevant to equitable tolling occurs after the Board has
issued the decision on appeal, the Federal Circuit held that "in
certain circumstances, the introduction of clarifying evidence on
[a] motion for reconsideration may be necessary to permit the
[Veterans C] ourt to fully evaluate the factual predicate of a veteran's
equitable tolling claim."54
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit cautioned that new evidence
should be introduced "only in limited circumstances."'49 The court
stressed that "[n]othing in this opinion should be interpreted as
departing-in cases outside of the equitable tolling context-from
the[] long-established and salutary precepts" that motions for
reconsideration should not permit litigants the opportunity for a
"second bite at the apple" and a chance to submit new evidence or
novel arguments.5' However, the court concluded that Mr. Dixon's
case did, in fact, present the unusual circumstances in which the
submission of clarifying evidence was appropriate, and it reversed
and remanded the Veterans Court decision.55'
2. Effect of revising a prior decision on benefits for surviving spouses
A disabled veteran's surviving spouse may be eligible for accrued
benefits that are "due and unpaid" to the veteran "under existing
ratings or decisions."552 In addition, a final decision by a RO or the
Board may be collaterally attacked-even decades later-if a claimant
establishes that there was CUE in the original decision.5 The effect
is retroactive: "[f] or the purpose of authorizing benefits," a decision
revised on the basis of CUE "has the same effect as if the decision had
been made on the date of the prior decision."554 In Rusick v. Gibson,
555
the Federal Circuit held that the Veterans Court correctly interpreted
the CUE statute and accrued benefits statute to affirm VA's denial of
accrued benefits to the veteran's spouse.56
In Rusick, the veteran had service-connected conditions that were
evaluated as 60 percent disabling from 1983 and 100 percent
548. Dixon, 741 F.3d at 1377 (citing Barrett v. Nicholson, 466 F.3d 1038, 1046
(Fed. Cir. 2006)).
549. Id. at 1378.
550. Id.
551. See id. at 1378-79.
552. 38 U.S.C. § 5121 (a) (2012).
553. Id. § 5109A (initiating review of the original decision may be brought by the
claimant or by the Secretary's own motion).
554. Id. § 5109A(b).
555. 760 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
556 Id. at 1347.
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disabling from 1996 until his death in April 2000.51 7 Shortly after his
death, Mr. Rusick's surviving spouse filed a claim for survivor benefits
and for accrued benefits, asserting that the 1983 rating decision was
the product of CUE and should be revised."8 She argued that the
evidence in 1983 showed that her husband had been unemployable
and, therefore, should have been evaluated as 100 percent disabled
starting in 1983." 9 The Board agreed and determined that, as a
result, Mrs. Rusick was eligible to receive dependency and indemnity
compensation ("DIC") because her husband had been evaluated as
totally disabled for 10 years or more immediately before his death, as
required by the governing statute.6°
The RO implemented this decision and awarded DIC, but found
that Mrs. Rusick was not eligible for accrued benefits.561 Mrs. Rusick
appealed this decision to the Board, which held that the finding of
CUE in the 1983 decision only had the "limited effect" of making
Mrs. Rusick eligible for DIC.562 If Mr. Rusick had filed a motion
asserting CUE during his lifetime, the Board's finding of CUE in the
1983 decision would have made Mrs. Rusick eligible for accrued
benefits.563 However, the Board concluded that a surviving spouse's
assertion of CUE after the veteran's death did not have the "further
effect" of making the surviving spouse eligible for accrued benefits.24
The Veterans Court affirmed the Board's interpretation, rejecting
Mrs. Rusick's argument that the retroactivity provision of the CUE
557. Id. at 1343 (providing background that the 60 percent combined disabling
rating was based on a 30 percent service-connected rating for the veteran's anxiety
disorder and 40 percent rating for service-connected hearing loss).
558. Id. at 1343-44. Mrs. Rusick originally asserted entitlement to dependency
and indemnity compensation ("DIC") and accrued benefits in May 2000, shortly after
her veteran spouse died, but VA denied both claims and Mrs. Rusick did not appeal.
Id. Six years later, in September 2006, she filed another claim for DIC and accrued
benefits, this time asserting that the 1983 rating decision should be revised because it
was the product of CUE. Id. at 1344.
559. Id. at 1344.
560. Id. (citing 38 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (2012)).
561. Id. If Mrs. Rusick were eligible for accrued benefits as a result of CUE in
the 1983 rating decision, she would have been entitled to receive the increased
amount of disability compensation that Mr. Rusick would have been entitled to
receive between 1983 and 1996 if he had been originally evaluated as 100 percent
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statute converted the corrected 1983 rating decision into an
"existing... decision" for purposes of the accrued benefits statute.565
On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected Mrs. Rusick's argument
concerning the effect of the CUE statute's retroactivity provision on
the 1983 rating decision.5 66 The court relied on its decision in Jones v.
West,5 67 which held that an accrued benefits claim submitted by a
surviving spouse was "derivative" of the veteran's claim and found that
the phrase "existing rating or decision" should be read narrowly."6
The court concluded it was also bound by its decision in Haines v.
West,569 which drew a clear distinction between § 5121, governing
surviving spouses' rights, and § 5109A, providing a procedure for
veterans to seek benefits that had been wrongly withheld.570 Haines
held that the CUE statute could not provide standing for a surviving
spouse to file his or her own motion alleging CUE when the veteran
had not filed such a motion during his or her lifetime.57'
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the CUE statute's
retroactivity provision did not apply to CUE determinations made
pursuant to remedial schemes such as 38 C.F.R. § 3.22, which is
designed to provide benefits to surviving spouses rather than
directly to veterans.572
3. Eligibility for benefits as a surviving spouse
As noted earlier, when a veteran dies, his or her surviving spouse
may be eligible for DIC.573 However, until 2003, an individual who
remarried was no longer considered a "surviving spouse" under the
statute and therefore no longer eligible for DIC benefits.574 In 2003,
Congress enacted the Veterans Benefits Act of 2003, which amended
the statute to authorize DIC benefits for surviving spouses who had
565. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (rationalizing its decision based on 38
U.S.C. § 5121 (the accrued benefits statute) and 38 U.S.C. § 5109A (the CUE statute)).
566. Id. at 1345-46.
567. 136 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
568. See id. at 1300 (citing Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236, 1241 (Fed. Cir.
1996)); see also Rusick, 760 F.3d at 1345-46 (relying on Jones to preclude Mrs.
Rusick's claim).
569. 154 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
570. See Rusick, 760 F.3d at 1345-46 (citing Haines, 154 F.3d at 1301-02).
571. See Haines, 154 F.3d at 1301 (basing the holding on the fact that the surviving
spouse is not the disability benefits claimant).
572. SeeRusick, 760 F.3d at 1346.
573. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1310-1318 (2012) (containing the DIC subchapter).
574. See 38 U.S.C. § 103(d) (2000).
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remarried after age 57.575 The new version of the statute also
provided that a surviving spouse who had remarried after age 57 before
the law was amended could be eligible for DIC benefits, but only if
that person applied to VA within a year after the statute was
enacted.576  This section of the Act essentially created a one-year
window for surviving spouses over age 57 who had remarried before
the law changed.
77
Norma Carroll fell into this category.578 She married veteran Glenn
Dodson in 1949, and the couple remained married until Mr. Dodson
died in 1992 from cardiac arrhythmia due to ALS.579 At the time of
his death, Mr. Dodson was not service connected for ALS 8.5 " After his
death, Ms. Carroll was eligible to apply for DIC and to argue that he
had died of service-related causes.5 1' However, she did not submit
such an application and became ineligible to apply for DIC when she
remarried in 1994, at age 64.582
When the law changed in 2003, Ms. Carroll again became eligible
to apply for DIC benefits until after the one-year window closed on
December 16, 2004.583 If she had applied for DIC at that time, she
would still have needed to prove that her husband's death was
575. See 38 U.S.C. § 103(d) (2) (B) (2012). Section 101(a) of the Act, which was
codified at 38 U.S.C. § 103(d) (2) (B), provided that "[t]he remarriage after age 57 of
the surviving spouse of a veteran shall not bar the furnishing of [certain benefits,
including DIC] to such person as the surviving spouse of the veteran." Id. The
House Committee Report accompanying the Act expressed concern that the existing
statute discouraged older spouses from remarrying; the amendment sought to
remove that disincentive. See H.R. REP. No. 108-211, at 12 (2003), reprinted in 2004
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2312 (encompassing a threshold age of 55 years old, not 57).
576. Veterans Benefits Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-183, § 101(e), 117 Stat. 2651,
2653. The Veterans Court decision noted: "Although portions of the Act were
codified in the United States Code, section 101 (e) was not." Carroll v. Shinseki, No.
12-2585, 2013 WL 3751775, at *1 n.1 (Vet. App. July 18, 2013) (citation omitted)
(non-precedential single judge memorandum decision), affd sub nom. Carrol v.
McDonald, 767 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The court continued, "[S]ection
101(e) is nonetheless controlling, as the statutes at large are legal evidence of the
laws." Id. (citing U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S.
439, 448 (1993)).
577. Carroll, 2013 WL 3751775, at *1-2.
578. Carroll v. McDonald, 767 F.3d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
579. Id.
580. See id. at 1370; Carroll, 2013 WL 3751775, at *2.
581. Carroll, 767 F.3d at 1369.
582. Id. (stating that remarrying removed her from the category of "surviving
spouse" under 38 U.S.C. § 103).
583. Id. at 1370; see supra note 576 (referencing controlling uncodified law found
in Public Law No. 108-183, § 101 (e) (2003)).
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connected to his military service by establishing the second and third
prongs of the test: that her husband had suffered an injury or disease
during service, and that it was causally linked to the disability that
caused his death-in this case, ALS. s4
In 2008, based on medical studies reporting an association between
active military service and ALS, VA promulgated a regulation
establishing presumptive service connection for ALS for any veteran
who developed the disease at any time after service."5 The following
year, Ms. Carroll applied for DIC benefits as Mr. Dodson's surviving
spouse.586 The Board denied the claim, finding that VA could not
recognize Ms. Carroll as a "surviving spouse" for the purpose of DIC
benefits because although she had remarried before 2003 after
attaining the age of 57, she had not applied for DIC benefits before
December 16, 2004. 7 As a result, the Board concluded that Ms.
Carroll did not meet the requirements established by the Veterans
Benefits Act of 2003 and denied the claim.8
On appeal to the Veterans Court, Ms. Carroll argued that section
101(e) did not apply to her because that section only applied to
surviving spouses "who would have been eligible for DIC in 2003 but
for the fact that they remarried.""9 She asserted that section 101 (e)
was inapplicable in her case because she did not become "eligible"
for benefits until 2008, when ALS became a presumptively service-
connected condition.90
The Veterans Court disagreed and affirmed the Board,91 relying
on the Federal Circuit's holding in Frederick v. Shinseki92 In that
decision, the Federal Circuit explained that section 101 (e)'s one-year
window applied to two categories of surviving spouses who remarried
after age 57."'9 The first category comprised of those who-like the
584. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.124a (2004) (containing rating tables of illnesses). Prior to
2008, ALS could be a service-connected condition, although it was not presumptively
service-connected. See Carroll, 767 F.3d at 1370.
585. 38 C.F.R. § 3.318 (2014); see Presumption of Service Connection for
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 73 Fed. Reg. 54,691, 54,691, 54,693 (Sept. 23, 2008)
(to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3).
586. Carroll, 767 F.3d at 1370.
587. Id.
588. Id.
589. Carroll v. Shinseki, No. 12-2585, 2013 WL 3751775, at *2 (Vet. App. July 18,
2013), affd sub nom. Carrol v. McDonald, 767 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
590. Id.; see also Carroll, 767 F.3d at 1370.
591. Carrol 2013 WL 3751775, at *2-3.
592. 684 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
593. Id. at 1266.
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widow in Frederick-"previously applied for and received DIC benefits,
and whose remarriage before the effective date of the Act destroyed
their eligibility for DIC benefits."594 The second category included
those surviving spouses who-like Ms. Carroll-had never applied for
DIC benefits after their veteran spouse died, but who lost eligibility
for DIC benefits by remarrying before the effective date of the Act.
595
In Frederick, the Federal Circuit held that both categories of surviving
spouses were required to apply for DIC benefits within the one-year
window created by section 101 (e).
596
The Veterans Court observed that Ms. Carroll appeared to be
"confus [ing] the concept of eligibility [to apply] for a benefit with that
of entitlement to a benefit."597  The Veterans Court explained that
"[a] lthough [Ms. Carroll] is correct that she could not make use of
the ALS presumption to establish entitlement o DIC benefits prior to
September 23, 2008, she has not demonstrated that she was ineligible
to submit an application for DIC benefits prior to that date."59 The
court further noted that Ms. Carroll could have applied for benefits
on the basis of direct service connection of her veteran husband's
death, which could have been granted "if the evidence supported
such an award."599 Accordingly, the court affirmed the Board's denial."o
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Ms. Carroll reiterated her
argument that she was not "'eligible for benefits' until 2008," after VA
relaxed the evidentiary burden required to establish service
connection for ALS.6° The Federal Circuit agreed with the Veterans
Court that Ms. Carroll's interpretation of the statute equated
eligibility for benefits with entitlement to benefits.6"2 The court
noted that although some sections of Title 38 appear to use the words
"eligibility" and "entitlement" interchangeably, there are other
sections that clearly make a distinction between the two concepts.6 3
Thus, the court was not persuaded that the two words were used
interchangeably throughout all of Title 38.6 4
594. Id.
595. Id.
596. Id. at 1273; see38 C.F.R § 3.55(a) (10) (ii) (2014) (implementing section 101 (e)).
597. Carroll v. Shinseki, No. 12-2585, 2013, WL 3751775, at *2 (Vet. App. July 18,
2013), affd sub nom. Carrol v. McDonald, 767 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
598. Id.
599. Id.
600. Id. at *3.
601. Carroll v. McDonald, 767 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
602. Id.
603. Id. at 1371-72.
604. Id.
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Furthermore, the Federal Circuit observed that section 103, the
part of Title 38 covering marital status and its effect on DIC
benefits-and the section that was amended in 2003-uses the two
terms differently.6 5 Accordingly, the court held that "[s]ection
101(e) ... creat[ed] temporary eligibility for the class of surviving
spouses who had previously been barred from seeking benefits due to
remarriage."606 The court concluded that Ms. Carroll was a member
of that class and, therefore, her eligibility for DIC benefits ended on
December 16, 2004, when the one-year filing window of section
101 (e) closed. 7 Accordingly, it affirmed the Veterans Court decision."°
4. Ability to file multiple CUE motions attacking the same RO decision
In Larson v. Shinseki,9 the Federal Circuit held that the Veterans
Court erred when it concluded that Mr. Larson, a Vietnam War
veteran, was only able to file one motion alleging CUE at the RO.
61
A final decision by a RO or the Board may be collaterally attacked,
even decades later, if the appellant establishes there was CUE in the
decision.6 ' To establish CUE, a claimant must first demonstrate
either that (1) "the correct facts, as they were known at the time,
were not before the adjudicator," or (2) "the statutory or regulatory
provisions extant at the time were incorrectly applied."'6 12 In such a
case, the claimant must provide "some degree of specificity as to
what the alleged error is and, unless it is the kind of error ... that, if
true, would be CUE on its face, persuasive reasons must be given as
to why the result would have been manifestly different but for the
alleged error."
613
Mr. Larson was granted disability benefits in 1969 based on a
gunshot wound in service that led to a 40% combined disability




609. 744 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
610 Id. at 1319.
611. See Pirkl v. Shinseki, 718 F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("[A] rating or
other adjudicative decision that constitutes a reversal or revision of a prior decision
on the grounds of CUE has the same effect as if the decision had been made on the
date of the prior decision." (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5109A(b) (2012))); see also Disabled
Am. Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 696-98 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that a final
decision by an RO may be attacked collaterally by a claim of CUE).
612. Willsey v. Peake, 535 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Russell v.
Principi, 3 Vet. App. 310, 313-14 (1992) (en banc)).
613. Fugo v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 40, 44 (1993).
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rating.614 Almost 40 years later, in 2007, he submitted a motion to
revise the 1969 decision on the basis that it contained CUE.
615
Specifically, he challenged the adjudicator's application of the
diagnostic codes in effect when the case was decided.616 The RO
denied the motion, and Mr. Larson appealed to the Board.617 After
identifying two separate allegations of CUE in the appeal, the Board
affirmed the RO, concluding that "the [v]eteran has not
demonstrated that the law in effect during that time was incorrectly
applied or that the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not
before the adjudicators."618
Mr. Larson appealed to the Veterans Court, arguing that he had
not asserted CUE based on the correct-facts prong of the test, and
that the Board's use of this phrase in its conclusion would preclude
him from being able to allege that error in the future."' He
submitted a motion to the Veterans Court requesting that it modify
the Board's decision by deleting the phrase about "correct facts."
620
The court dismissed the motion as moot and affirmed the entire
Board decision, concluding, based on Hillyard v. Shinseki,21 that the
veteran had exhausted his one opportunity to raise any and all
allegations of CUE as to that matter.622
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court's
dismissal of the motion to modify the Board decision.623 The court
noted that Hillyard interpreted the regulation that limits the number
of times a claimant may challenge a Board decision based on an
allegation of CUE.624 However, a different regulation permits a
claimant to challenge an RO decision based on an allegation of CUE,
and the court's previous cases established that a new allegation of
CUE in an RO decision could be raised "at any time. "625 The Federal




618. Id. (emphasis added).
619. Id.
620. Id.
621. 24Vet. App. 343 (2011), affd, 695 F.3d 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
622. Larson, 744 F.3d at 1318. Hillyard held that veterans could not seek revision
of a claim based on CUE since there was no CUE in the decision and decisions
cannot be endlessly reviewed. Hillyard, 24 Vet. App. at 354.
623. Larson, 744 F.3d at 1319.
624. Id.
625. Id.; see Andrews v. Nicholson, 421 F.3d 1278, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding
that when VA fails to liberally read a veteran's claim to raise all possible claims, the
matter is corrected through a CUE motion); Andre v. Principi, 301 F.3d 1354, 1362
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Circuit concluded that "[b]ecause [the veteran] only challenged the
legal basis for the [RO] 's 1969 determination, and did not assert that
the adjudicators did not have the correct facts before them at the
time of the decision, [he] remains free to raise a 'correct facts' CUE
claim in the future at the [RO]Y""626 Accordingly, it reversed the
Veterans Court's denial of the motion to modify the Board decision
and remanded the matter so the merits could be considered.627
IV. THEMES RAISED BY THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S 2014 VETERANS
LAW CASES
The Federal Circuit's 2014 veterans law cases mirror a trend of the
Supreme Court to question the validity of judicial deference to
agency regulatory interpretation.628  The veterans law cases shed
additional light on the issue because the agency at issue is VA.
A. Validity fAuer Deference
Courts afford different levels of deference to agency regulations,
depending on the circumstance. First, to determine if an agency
action warrants deference, the regulation must be ambiguous: if the
plain language indicates the meaning clearly, there is no need for
judicial interpretation.629 However, if a court determines that a
regulation is ambiguous, then "[a] n agency's interpretation of its own
regulation is controlling unless that interpretation is 'plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulation.' 6"° This rule, was established by
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.63 1 in 1945,632 was reiterated in 1997
in Auer and has become known as "Auer deference.6 33
However, some members of the U.S. Supreme Court have
expressed interest in revisiting the validity of Auer deference. In
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (ruling that a veteran may present a new allegation that the RO
made a clear and unmistakable error at any time in the proceedings); 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.105(a) (2014) (stating previous determinations are final and binding unless there
is proof of CUE).
626. Larson, 744 F.3d at 1319.
627. Id.
628. See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131
S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
629. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
630. Thun v. Shinseki, 572 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
631. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
632. Id. at 415.
633. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
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2011, Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence in Talk America, Inc. v.
Michigan Bell Telephone. Co.,634 stating that although he had, in the
past, "uncritically accepted" the rule established in Seminole Rock and
reiterated in Auer, he had more recently "become increasingly
doubtful of its validity." 5 He observed that, although judicial
deference to an agency's interpretation of its regulations seems to be
a "natural corollary" of judicial deference to an agency's
interpretation of its statutes, there is a fundamental distinction that
violates constitutional principles. 36 He continued:
[W] hen an agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself
the implementation of that rule, and thus the initial determination
of the rule's meaning. And though the adoption of a rule is an
exercise of the executive rather than the legislative power, a
properly adopted rule has fully the effect of law. It seems contrary
to fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit the
person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.
6 7
While another doctrine involving court deference to an agency,
"Chevron deference656 s does not motivate Congress to enact vague
rules knowing that an agency will have latitude in the future to
interpret them as the agency might wish, Auer deference does have
that effect.65 9 Justice Scalia concluded that "deferring to an agency's
interpretation of its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague
rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it
pleases. This frustrates the notice and predictability purposes of
rulemaking, and promotes arbitrary government."6 4' The case at
hand, Justice Scalia believed, was a good example of why Auer
deference is inappropriate, because the agency in question had been
intentionally abusing it: "[t]he seeming inappropriateness of Auer
deference," he asserted, "is especially evident in cases such as these,
involving an agency that has repeatedly been rebuked in its attempts
634. 131 S. Ct. 2254 (2011).
635. Id. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring).
636. Id.
637. Id.
638. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984). "Chevron deference" denotes a two-part test, first announced in Chevron,
in which a court will defer to an agency's interpretation of a federal statute if "(1)
the statute is ambiguous or does not address the question at issue, and (2) the
agency's interpretation of the statute is reasonable." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 270
(9th ed. 2009).
639. Talk America, 131 S. Ct. at 2266 (Scalia,J., concurring).
640. Id.
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to expand the statute beyond its text, and has repeatedly sought new
means to the same ends."
641
Two years later, Justice Scalia returned even more emphatically to
the Auer deference issue in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense
Center.6"2  He scathingly noted that the agency in that case-the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-had argued for an
"unnatural reading" of the regulation at issue despite the fact that
"the agency has vividly illustrated that it can write a rule saying
precisely what it means-by doing just that while these cases were
being briefed."'" He concluded: "Enough is enough. For decades,
and for no good reason, we have been giving agencies the authority
to say what their rules mean, under the harmless-sounding banner of
'defer[ring] to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations."'644
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, although concurring in the result
of the case, joined the dissent in recognizing the concerns about
agency deference, stating that "l[t] he issue is a basic one going to the
heart of administrative law" and that "[q] uestions of Seminole Rock and
Auer deference arise as a matter of course on a regular basis."'6 45 The
two Justices agreed that Justice Scalia's concurring opinion "raise [d]
serious questions about the principle" and that "there is some interest
in reconsidering those cases," but urged their dissenting colleague to
"await a case in which the issue is properly raised and argued.""6
Even more recently, in the March 2015 case of Perez v. Mortgage
Bankers Association," Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas reiterated
their objections to the principle of judicial deference to agency
interpretations of regulations and indicated their desire to address
the issue in the future." Thus, it seems that it will only be a matter
of time until the concerns about Auer deference are formally
considered by the nation's highest court.
641. Id.
642. 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
643. Id. at 1339 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
644. Id. (alteration in original).
645. Id. at 1338-39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (joined by Justice Alito).
646, Id.
647. 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
648. Id. at 1210-11 (Alito, J., concurring in part); id. at 1211-13 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); id. at 1213-25 (ThomasJ, concurring).
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B. VA is Unique Among Agencies in Ways that Affect Deference
For several reasons, the question of agency deference is more
complex in the area of veterans law. 9 First, as noted earlier, VA is
unique among agencies-even among agencies that administer
government benefits or federal assistance programs-in having both
procedural and substantive duties to assist its beneficiaries in
processing their claims.65 In its goals, operations, and procedures,
VA is strikingly different from agencies that provide economic or
industry regulation, such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, or the Environmental
Protection Agency."1
The question of agency deference is also complicated by the fact
that, although veterans benefits are "a creature of statute," neither
the Veterans Court nor the Federal Circuit have addressed the
inherent tension between the two major interpretive doctrines that
are applied to veterans benefits statutes.6 52  The doctrine most
familiar to general practitioners is that established in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,653 which held
that a court should defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of
a statute it administers.5 4 In the context of the explicitly claimant-
friendly veterans benefits system, however, both Chevron deference
and Auer deference are often at odds with the presumption,
established in Gardner, that interpretive doubt should be resolved in
the veteran's favor.655
649. Linda D. Jellum, Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: Reconciling Brown v. Gardner's
Presumption That Interpretive Doubt Be Resolved in Veterans 'Favor with Chevron, 61 AM. U.
L. REv. 59, 61 (2011) (noting that VA law is different than other agencies because
there is the unusual presumption in favor of the veteran that gives the claimant an
interpretive role).
650. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (describing VA's duty and
responsibility while assisting claimants). Other benefits-administering agencies
include the Social Security Administration (SSA), Employee Bene~ts Security
Administration (EBSA), and U.S. Department of Labor.
651. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text (describing VAs uniqueness in
comparison to other agencies, such as its different evidentiary and procedural standards).
652. See James D. Ridgway, Toward a Less Adversarial Relationship Between Chevron
and Gardner, 9 U. MASS. L. REV. 388, 398 (2014) [hereinafter Ridgway, Less
Adversafial] (noting that both of these doctrines state how ambiguity should be
resolved in veterans law cases, however, each doctrine usually points to opposite
outcomes in cases when the claimant and VA Secretary are in disagreement).
653. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
654. Id. at 865.
655. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 117-18 (1994).
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Another relevant difference is that judicial review of the agency is
still comparatively new. In 1930, Congress consolidated the various
programs that managed veterans benefits and created the Veterans
Administration, which was later renamed the Department of
Veterans Affairs.656  However, VA operated for decades without
judicial scrutiny and was not even subject to the requirements of the
Administrative Procedures Act.657  Until the Veterans Court was
established in 1988, VA was the only administrative agency that
operated virtually free of judicial oversight.658 The agency had been
promulgating regulations since 1930 without needing to be
concerned about whether they would withstand judicial review, and
the idea of judicial deference to the agency's interpretation was
simply not an issue for most of its history.659
Finally, the regulations promulgated by the agency have been
subject to ongoing criticism.66 1 In his concurrence in Johnson v.
Shinseki,66' Judge Moorman noted that VA's confusing regulations
were the source of many disputes before the court, and that if this
problem were solved, then "veterans and their families, the courts,
and VA will no longer need to defer to the 'intended meaning' of
656. See History-VA History, U.S. DEP'T VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.va.gov/
about-va/vahistory.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2015) (informing that the Veterans
Administration was formed from the Veterans Bureau in 1930 before being
named the Department of Veterans Affairs upon its elevation to a cabinet level
position in 1989); see also History, U.S. CT. APP. FOR VETERANS CLAIMS,
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/history.php (last visited Apr. 23, 2015) [hereinafter
CAVC History] (mentioning that, before the Veterans Court was established, a veteran
whose claim was denied by the Department of Veteran Affairs was not afforded any
independent review of the Department's decision).
657. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting that not till 1988, the
agency was not subject to judicial scrutiny nor subject to APA requirements because
the benefits it administered were viewed as provided under a paternalistic charitable
model and not an adversarial model).
658. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also CAVC History, supra note 656
(stressing that for decades, the House Committee of Veterans' Affairs had
consistently resisted veterans and advocates efforts to alter the VA's position as the
single Federal administrative agency not subject to judicial review).
659. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text (stating that the Veterans Court
was given the discretion to decide cases by either non-precedential, single-judge
memorandum decisions; precedential three-judge panels, or full-court opinions).
660. William L. Pine & William F. Russo, Making Veterans Benefits Clear: VA's
Regulation Reurite Project, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 407, 408-09 (2009) (describing the
regulations as increasingly complex, difficult to understand, and ambiguous, and
concluding that these problems have caused uncertainty in the process and resulted
in expensive litigation).
661. 26Vet. App. 237 (2013) (en banc), rev'd, 762 F.3d 1362 Fed. Cir. 2014).
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regulations that were written and then modified decades before
judicial review. "682 In 1991, in one of its earliest published decisions,
the Veterans Court criticized VA's regulations as "a confusing
tapestry," finding that the relevant regulations were "in some respects
duplicative and in others apparently conflicting.""66 Ten years later,
in May 2001, VA Secretary AnthonyJ. Principi instructed the agency
to create a plan to review the regulations governing benefits and
determine which ones needed to be updated or modified.664 In
October 2001, the VA Claims Processing Task Force recommended
that the agency "[f]irst, rewrite and organize the [compensation
and pension] [r]egulations in a logical and coherent manner."665
The Secretary approved the recommendation, which led to the
establishment of the VA Regulation Rewrite Project.6 6  The
Project's goal was to write regulations that people can read,
understand, and apply.
67
Since 2004, VA published numerous Notices of Public Rulemaking
in the Federal Register to solicit public comments on the proposed
new regulations and, in November 2013, the agency published a
second Notice of Public Rulemaking proposing the entire set of
rewritten regulations together for a second round of public
comment.668 However, at the same time, VA has stated that it "does
not intend to publish a final rule in this rulemaking proceeding in
the near future" because it needs to allocate its resources to its
"priority goals of processing all disability claims within 125 days and
662. Id. at 252 (Moorman,J., concurring).
663. Hatlestad v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 164, 167 (1991).
664. William A. Moorman & William F. Russo, Serving Our Veterans Through Clearer
Rules, 56 ADMIN. L. Rrv. 207, 208 (2004) (stating that VA intends "to rewrite these
regulations in a logical, claimant-focused, and user-friendly format... to help
veterans, their families, and VA personnel understand regulatory provisions that
directly affect compensation and pension determinations").
665. Id. (citation omitted).
666. Id.
667. Id. (expressing that the goal was to rewrite the regulations in a more user-
friendly format that would more easily help veterans and their family understand the
provisions that directly affects their compensation and pension claims).
668. See VA Compensation and Pension Regulation Rewrite Project, 78 Fed. Reg.
71,042, 71,042 (proposed Nov. 27, 2013) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pts. 3, 5) ("The
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) proposes to reorganize and rewrite its
compensation and pension regulations in a logical, claimant-focused, and user-
friendly format. The intended effect of the proposed revisions is to assist claimants,
beneficiaries, veterans' representatives, and VA personnel in locating and
understanding these regulations."). VA published twenty notices since 2004. Id.
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increasing rating quality to 98 percent by the end of 2015."1669 The
agency noted that, until these goals were met, it would continue to
amend its regulations piecemeal, although it might "refer to" or
"incorporate" the work of the Regulation Rewrite Project, "in whole
or in part[,] depending on the nature of the amendments. "670
In his concurrence in Johnson v. Shinseki, Judge Moorman noted
that "VA's regulations generally are confusing, not well organized,
and in dire need of reformulation. "671 He explained that these
characteristics created the need for judicial interpretation, observing
that VA's confusing regulations were the source of many disputes
before the court, and that if this problem were solved, then "veterans
and their families, the courts, and VA will no longer need to defer to
the 'intended meaning' of regulations that were written and then
modified decades before judicial review. "672
C. The Federal Circuit Raises Concerns about Auer Deference
Judge Moorman's concurrence in Johnson v. Shinseki6 73 foreshadows
Judge O'Malley's concurrence in Johnson v. McDonald 1 4 and directly
addresses the issue of Auer deference. For this reason, these
concurrences are worth examining in some detail.
In his concurrence, Judge Moorman explicitly questioned whether
VA should be afforded less judicial deference than other agencies.675
He first stated that he agreed with the majority because of "the high
degree of deference that the [Federal Circuit] ... traditionally has
shown for the Secretary's interpretation of his own regulatory words,
even when the interpretation has first been advanced during
litigation. "676 Judge Moorman believed that judicial deference to the
agency's interpretation, which he described as "plausible, albeit not
obvious," was the only reason remand was not required.677 He
continued: "In the absence of the Secretary's recently asserted
interpretation, I would apply the simple principle that words have
669. Id. at 71,043.
670. Id.
671. Johnson v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 237, 252 (2013) (en banc) (Moorman, J.,
concurring), rev'd sub nom. Johnson v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
672. Id.
673. Id. at 237.
674. Johnson v. McDonald, 762 F.3d, 1362 (2014) (O'MalleyJ., concurring).
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meaning. And, even in the law and regulations implementing the
law, plain words should have plain meanings."678
Although he concurred in the result, Judge Moorman observed
that, in contrast to the deference that courts afford to an agency's
interpretation of its own statutes, veterans benefits statutes are also
subject to the presumption that they should be read and applied in
the veteran's favor679 and that "[t]he VA disability compensation
system is not meant to be ... a stratagem to deny compensation to a
veteran who has a valid claim."'  Accordingly, he concluded:
I question whether the judicial precedents for reviewing VA's
regulations should always result in the same level of deference
afforded to the interpretation of such regulations promulgated by
agencies charged with regulating business practices, intellectual
property, or international trade. After all, VA serves a purpose
unique among Federal agencies, characterized by the legal duty to
assist its claimants in perfecting their just claims, supported by
legislation requiring that the benefit of the doubt must be given to
such claimants, and further undergirded by a uniquely pro-veteran,
nonadversarial agency process. Perhaps VA, as an agency whose
mission statement is etched in stone at the Lincoln Memorial and
was formulated as part of President Lincoln's Second Inaugural
Address: "to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for
his widow, and his orphan," should, in this case, be afforded a less
strict level ofjudicial deference."
In her concurrence in Johnson v. McDonald, Judge O'Malley
elaborated upon the concerns about the appropriateness of Auer
deference in the context of veterans law. 2 She first confirmed that
she agreed with her colleagues' analysis and that she only wrote
separately to note that, if the regulation at issue had been deemed
ambiguous, she believed it would have been appropriate to
reconsider whether the court should continue to apply Auer
deference.68 She echoed the concerns expressed in the concurrence
in Talk America, stating that "deferring to an agency's interpretation
of its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give
it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases. This
678. Id. at 248-49.
679. Id. at 251 (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994)).
680. Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
681. Johnson, 26 Vet. App. at 251 (Moorman, J., concurring) (footnote omitted)
(citation omitted) (citing Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 412 (2009)).
682. Johnson v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 1362,1366-67 (2014) (O'Malley,J., concurring).
683. Id.
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frustrates the notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking.' '6s4
She also agreed that the "'beneficial effect"' of the efficiency created
by Auer deference "cannot justify a rule that not only has no
principled basis but contravenes one of the great rules of separation
of powers: He who writes a law must not adjudge its violation."685
However, Judge O'Malley also observed that the appropriateness of
judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation
is more complicated when the agency in question is VA.686 Because of
the conflict between Chevron and Gardner, " [w] here there is a conflict
between an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous
regulation and a more veteran-friendly interpretation, it is unclear
which interpretation controls."'687 Accordingly, she concluded that
"the validity of Auer deference is questionable, both generally and
specifically as it relates to veterans' benefit cases."68
CONCLUSION
Auer deference is powerful. First, the standard is relatively low: if a
regulation is found to be ambiguous, courts will defer to an agency's
interpretation of its own regulation as long as that interpretation is
not "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."'689 This
standard remains in effect even when the agency's interpretation was
announced without resort to formal steps, as long as the
interpretation reflects the agency's fair and considered judgment on
the matter.69  Second, the deference is generous. The Federal
Circuit noted in O'Bryan that courts "afford 'broad deference' to [an
agency's] interpretations [of its regulations], even more so than an
agency's construction of a statute."'691
684. Id. at 1367 (quoting Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254,
2266 (2011) (ScaliaJ., concurring)).
685. Id. (quoting Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1342 (2013)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
686. Id.
687. Id.
688. Id. at 1368.
689. Thun v. Shinseki, 572 F.3d 1366, 1369 (2009); see O'Bryan v. McDonald, 771
F.3d 1376, 1379 (2014) (emphasizing that deference to an agency's interpretation of
its own regulation is permitted when the regulation is ambiguous unless that
interpretation is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation"); see also
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (deferring to a "plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation" standard to determine if the government's
interpretation of its own regulation, a salary-basis test, was controlling).
690. Thun, 572 F.3d at 1369 (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 462-63).
691. O'Bryan, 771 F.3d at 1380 (citing Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
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The Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit arrived at the same
conclusion in 2014: that Auer deference might make even less sense
in the context of veterans law than in other areas. As Judge
Moorman noted in his concurrence in Johnson v. Shinseki, the
Supreme Court recently reiterated its concerns about Auer deference
in Decker and Talk America, and then used the four-factor test
established in Skidmore v. Swif 92 to determine what level of deference
it would afford to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations.693
The Supreme Court examined: (1) the "thoroughness evident in
[the agency's] consideration, [2] the validity of its reasoning, [3] its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and [4] all those
factors which give it power to control."694
Whether and how the Supreme Court chooses to handle Auer
deference in the upcoming years may prove consequential, especially
in the context of veterans law. On one hand, the complexity of the
agency's procedures weighs in favor of greater judicial deference by
the courts because the agency's expertise should create "a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance."69 On the other hand, VA's many
problems with its regulations and the ongoing criticism of the
agency's ability to meet its obligations to the nation's veterans
provide an argument for less deference. Given that all levels of the
judiciary have expressed interest in addressing this topic, it would not
be surprising to see more cases addressing it in 2015.
692. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
693. Johnson v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 237, 251 (2013) (en banc) (Moorman, J.,
concurring), rev'd sub nom. Johnson v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
694. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
695. Ridgway, Less Adversarial, supra note 652, at 396 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at
140). The "expertise" rationale has been a long-standing explanation for why courts
afford deference to agency interpretations. Id.
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